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Abstract
This project examines the United States-Ghana relationship and how the relationship
transformed Ghana, 1957-1966. African leaders such as Dr. Kwame Nkrumah had declared:
"That new Africa is ready to fight its own battles and show that after all, the black man is
capable of managing his affairs." Despite the non-alignment philosophy, Ghana was not neutral
regarding the West and East blocs rivalry. The thesis argues that it was through the United
States' government and private firms' contributions that Ghana was able to achieve the mark of
a modern nation through industrialization, universal education, and the expansion of
international trade economy.
The United States government and the Kaiser company, a private firm, contributed to
the development of the Volta River Project, which increased industrial activities in Ghana
through the production of hydroelectric energy needed to supply electricity for households and
industries. In the end, the project benefited both the United States and Ghana as Ghana moved
towards modernization while the Kaiser Company maximized profit, and the United States
government was able to counter the Soviets expansion in Ghana. President John F. Kennedy's
Peace Corps and Cornell University’s programs expanded the Ghanaian education system by
increasing enrolment, the number of graduates, and shaped most Ghanaians for a white-collar
job. Ghana-American relations increased trade activities through the exchange of trade
products. America's organization of the biggest Trade Fair in Ghana in 1961 helped Ghanaians
to learn new skills, to acquire techniques in operating trade equipment, and to recognize the
importance of private and smaller firms in national economy. This research fills a significant
gap in the historiography by examining the political, social, and economic interactions between
Ghana and America. It as well discusses governmental and private organizations' roles together
with how personal relations among statesmen transformed Ghana into a modernized country.
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Introduction
As African colonies began achieving independence during the Cold War era,
Africans began to participate in world politics and implemented strategies for nationbuilding. In the course of African countries gaining independence, some Europeans and
Americans began to express interest in these new African countries through the forming
of alliances. Although Europeans and the United States desired to assist the new African
countries, foreign powers protected their parochial interests. The Europeans and the
United States exhibited support through various means, including offering aid through
private companies to support university education and businesses.1 According to Jay
Lovestone, an American trade union leader, "Africa has become the real battleground
and the next field of the big test of strength, not only for the free world and the
Communist world but for our own country and our allies who are colonialist powers."2
No country was more central to this battleground than Ghana. Achieving
independence in 1957 after a painful colonial past, Ghanaians sought self-sufficiency
and sovereignty. However, Ghana realized its goals could not be achieved without help
from the outside world (foreign countries). Thus, with extreme trepidation, Ghana's
leaders faced the irony of depending on other nations to help Ghana achieve political
and economic independence. In the early 1960s, Ghana forged an awkward but
temporarily fruitful relationship with the United States. This alliance yielded real gains,
but it was also beset by frequent tensions that ultimately undermined a relationship that
was perhaps doomed from the start.

1

Moses Awinsong Allor, "The Power of the Periphery: Aid, Mutuality and Cold War U. S-Ghana
Relations, 1957-1966" (MA Thesis, Eastern Illinois University, 2017), 1.
2
John C. Stoner, “We Will Follow a Nationalist Policy, But We Will Be Neutral: American Labor and
Neutralism in Cold War Africa, 1957-1962” in American Labor’s Global Ambassador: The International
History of the AFL-CIO During the Cold War, eds. Robert Anthony Waters, and Geert Van Geothem
(New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2013): 240.
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The beginning of America's relations with Africa dates to the transatlantic slave
trade period in the seventeenth century. A group of African slaves was shipped to the
United States.3 Nevertheless, the United States did not have much influence on Africa
during the nineteenth and early twentieth century due to European dominance as the
colonial masters of Africa. The dominance of the Europeans declined after World War
II. After the Second World War, a new global awareness, and the need to compete with
the Soviet Union spurred the United States' relations with Africa into a new phase.
Superpower competition between Russia and America compelled the United States to
take a new look at Africa. Russia sought to spread its communist ideology while the
United States hoped to spread its capitalist philosophy. The United States and Russia's
geopolitical competition created the Cold War.4
During the Cold War, African leaders, countries, and Africans were faced with
having to decide with which of the blocs to form an alliance. Most African nations opted
to remain aloof from the Cold War. African leaders emphasized independence,
neutrality, and positive non-alignment. The president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah,
declared: "That new Africa is ready to fight its own battles and show that after all, the
black man is capable of managing his affairs."5 However, the drive to create a
modernized and developed nation presented significant challenges for the newly
independent nation. Initially, Ghana had a powerful trade relationship with most
neighboring countries in Africa. Nonetheless, lack of experienced professionals coupled
with financial challenges- marks of many new nations—slowed Ghana’s development.

3

Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola, The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations
(Rochester: University Rochester Press, 2008), 1.
4
“Race Relations in the United States and American Cultural and Informational Programs in Ghana,
1957–1966,” National Archives, August 15, 2016,
https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1999/winter/us-and-ghana-1957-1966-1.html.
5
“Kwame Nkrumah Independence Speech in Ghana on 6 March 1957,” African Heritage, Accessed
February 19, 2019, https://afrolegends.com/2012/10/04/kwame-nkrumahs-independence-speech-on-6march-1957/.
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As such, Ghana sought outside leverage. It shifted back and forth, leaning at times to
the Americans, and at other times to the Soviets. United States-Ghanaian relations,
therefore, were hardly linear and smooth.6
From the declaration of the new nation's independence, the importance of
Ghana and America's strong relations was clear from the presence of United States
delegates and African-Americans at the ceremony inaugurating the new nation.
Prominent African Americans, including Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., attended Ghana's
1957 independence ceremony. Due to the significance the United States placed on its
alliance with the new nation, the Eisenhower administration dispatched vice president
Richard Nixon to attend the Independence Day ceremony. At one point, the vice
president effusively asked observers, "How does it feel to be free." Surprisingly, the
bystanders replied, "We would not know. We are from Alabama."7 The presence of the
African-Americans, such as King, indicates how important the American government
perceived the new nation, Ghana, in the future of world politics and economics. African
Americans who honored the independence day ceremony rejected the general
impression of Europeans and Americans. African Americans' connections with Africans
to assist in their struggle for independence were deemed an act of disloyalty to European
nations and America.8
Over the next ten years after Ghana's independence, America invested heavily
and contributed to the transformation of the new nation. The United States invested in
the new nation's agricultural, educational, trade, and military sectors. The United States
benefitted from Ghana through the exploitation of its resources, and Ghana served as

“Race Relations in the United States and American Cultural and Informational Programs in Ghana,
1957–1966,”
7
“Race Relations in the United States and American Cultural and Informational Programs in Ghana,
1957–1966,”
8
Kevin Gaines, American Africans in Ghana Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 9-10.
6
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the home for Peace Corps volunteers, NGOs, missionaries, and other American
organizations. Ghana had little to offer to the outside world, and it leaned on America's
investment for its industrial development, trade interaction, educational development,
and the growth of its infrastructures.
This thesis argues that it was through Ghana's relationship with the United
States during the first decade of the new country's birth that the quest for a modern
nation was achieved. Ghana's relations with America aided in Ghana's goal of selfsufficiency. The thesis posits that personal relations, rather than wholly economic and
national interest played a pivotal role in Kennedy's assistance to Ghana and contributed
towards the nation’s transformation. During the decolonization era, the formation of
relations with a country with a strong economy became key in transforming the “Third
World” nations. African leaders wanted to transform their nation and experience the
modernize level of the Western and Eastern powers. Hence, Ghana’s initial relations
with foreign powers were strongly guided by the need to satisfy industrialization,
universal education, and promote international trade. Ghanaians sought to advance their
political, economic, and social systems to surpass what they had inherited from the
colonial master.
Nkrumah had declared non-alignment and positive neutrality, yet it was through
the support of the United States government, private companies, and his friend,
Kennedy, that his quest for a modern Ghana materialized. Over the next ten years, when
Nkrumah was in power, Ghana's social, economic, and political systems grew
competitively. Ghana spent more than 100 years under the British hegemony and
colonial legacies provided political, social, and economic systems in Ghana. However,
Ghana's relations with Britain did not ensure significant development by 1957. Ghana's
relations with the United States in the post-independence era played a pivotal role in

4

shaping the new country. Ghana grew to surpass that of many "Third World" countries.
The new country experienced significant progress in terms of science and technology,
professionalization, urbanization, industrialization, centralization of the state
institutions, mass democracy, and public education. The progresses Ghana attained
were indicators of what Michel Foucault describes as elements of modernity.9
From the 1950s, the development of universal education, industrialization,
professionalization, centralization of the state institutions, existence of democratic
institutions, free-market capitalism, individualism, artistic progress, and international
trade characterized the idea of a modernized nation. Modernization became much
popular in the minds of the people in the “Third World” during the Cold War Era.
Nkrumah wanted Ghana to achieve the height of these transformations in a short time
as a mark of a modern nation in the Cold War period. While modernized nations existed
in the world before the Cold War period, many countries in the “Third World” were not
modernized when measured along the lines of industrialization, universal education,
international trade, scientific and technological progress.10
The United States influenced and was influenced by Ghana's political, social,
and economic developments as the two nations interacted with each other. Personal
relationships among statesmen coupled with the economic interest and America's
national interest to intervene in the "Third World" shaped American and Ghanaian
relations. Although America-Ghana relations encountered significant obstacles en route
to Ghana's modernization, the Ghanaian and American culture shaped the relationship
between the two nations. The Ghanaian culture of being generally friendly while
maintaining non-alignment in the acceptance of support from other foreign powers

9

Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books,
1977), 170–77.
10
Greg Barnhisel, “Perspective USA and the Cultural Cold War: Modernism in Service of the State,”
Modernism/modernity 14 no. 4 (November 2007): 730-734.

5

shaped Ghana's foreign policies.11 The American dream that each American must have
the freedom to achieve a better life, also guided American foreign relations. The
American political culture that Alexis de Tocqueville described in the 1830s as
characterized by elements such as liberty, equality, democracy, individualism, the rule
of law, nationalism, capitalism, and open markets shaped American relations with
Ghana.12
This project focuses on the first decade after Ghana's independence (19571966), essentially the period of Kwame Nkrumah's tenure as the head of Ghana. The
study examines the United States' contributions to shaping Ghana's transition after
independence. Specifically, the thesis focuses on the political, social, and economic
influence of the United States on Ghana and how Ghana influenced the United States
together with Ghanaian receptiveness (and sometimes resistance) to that guidance. It
analyzes three areas of influence: the development of the Volta River Project (modeled
on the American Tennessee Valley Authority), the creation of a national education
system through the Peace Corps program, and other policies by both governmental and
private organizations, and the strengthening of anti-communist trade relations. The
study intends to show how the United States contributed to Nkrumah's quest to
modernize Ghana through industrialization, universal education, and trade relations.
Organization of the Study
Chapter One describes Ghana-America interaction by focusing on the
development of the Volta River Project (modeled on the American T.V.A.). It details
the background to the construction of the Volta River Project, and the developmental
role of the United States, the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Company, the Volta

UShistory.org, “American Political Attitudes and Participation.” American Political Culture: American
Government Online Textbook, Accessed February 29, 2020, https://www.ushistory.org/gov/4a.asp.
12
UShistory.org, “American Political Attitudes and Participation,”
11
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Aluminum Company (VALCO), and other organizations. Additionally, it examines the
benefits the project created for the United States, Ghana, and the various organizations
involved in the interaction. Chapter Two provides a detailed discussion on U.S. support
in building the Ghanaian educational system. The chapter examines the colonial system
of education, its post-independence challenges, Nkrumah's educational vision, the
contributions of the Peace Corps program towards Ghana's education system and the
challenges both the United States government and volunteer teachers faced during the
Peace Corps period. This chapter also reveals how Cornell University, as a separate
institution in the United States, contributed to Ghana's educational system during the
first decade. Chapter Three details the strengthening of anti-communist trade relations.
The chapter examines the interaction between the American government, private
organizations, individuals, and Ghana. It also discusses potential trade interactions, the
United States Trade Fair, the activities of American statesmen in Ghana, and the status
of Ghana's trade relations at the end of Nkrumah’s era. Finally, Chapter Four offers and
ties together the three areas of development as conclusions.
Historiography
Over the years, historians have developed an interest in examining United States
foreign policies in Africa during the Cold War era. Several historical studies have
examined United States' interactions with African countries, especially Ghana. Most of
the existing literature focuses on state-state relationships while ignoring the interactions
between private organizations in the United States and Ghanaian relations. Moreover,
some scholars have prioritized national ideology and economic interests as the only
significant areas of America-Africa relations. These studies tend to ignore how
Ghanaian and American statesmen’s relationship influenced other areas of Ghana’s
development.

7

In her 2013 book, Foreign Intervention in Africa, From the Cold War to the
War on Terror, African specialist Elizabeth Schmidt argues that during the Cold War,
nations formed bilateral and multilateral relations. Each nation's alliances centered on
the benefits the nation envisaged to obtain from the others. Developing countries
formed alliances to obtained assistance in helping them modernize. Schmidt posits that
political competition among the various powers influenced European interest in Africa.
She asserts that economic interests and not personal relationships guided state-to-state
interactions.13 Schmidt argues that Africa's path to modernization was not dependent
on the relationship with the United States or any other foreign power. For Schmidt, the
impression that Africans were the cause of all their problems is erroneous. Africa's
problems were a direct result of the influence of foreign nations, Schmidt asserts. She
avers that the powerful nations aimed to manipulate African nations to satisfy
superpower political, economic, and social interests. America, Russia, and various
European powers did not promote Africans' desire for modernization.14
Schmidt argues that powerful nations were encroachers who sought to
monopolize African politics, economics, and social affairs for the benefit of foreign
nations. Her argument reinterprets the nature of the relationship which existed between
African nations and the various world powers during the Cold War era. According to
her, foreign nations intervened in Africa to ensure the parochial interest of foreign
powers. She cautions historians to stop blaming Africans for their predicaments. In
some instances, the Cold War could be described as an invasion of Africa by
superpowers.

13

Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.
14
Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa, xiii.
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We as historians must understand that, whereas the superpowers sought to
promote their own national interests through their interactions with Africa, they also
played a significant role in transforming Africa. Foreign powers served as interveners
in shaping newly independent nations that faced diverse problems at the time of their
independence. Some foreign aid was aimed at reducing the poverty rate in newly
independent nations. African nations were agents who, at certain times for the sake of
their interests, negotiated alliances with outsiders. Schmidt's view sharply differs since
she believed foreign powers were encroachers in Africa, and the powers only sought
their national interest. She did not highlight the contributions of nations such as the
United States towards the development of some African countries like Ghana. Ghana
benefited significantly from their connection to foreign powers. This project discusses
how the United States, an outsider, contributed significantly to Ghana's transition to
industrialization and modernization.
In contrast to Schmidt's view, some scholars have also argued that President
Kennedy's aid to Africa was an act of genuine sympathy aimed at building Africa as a
continent. In his book, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John
F. Kennedy, American political scientist Richard Walton argues that Kennedy
genuinely showed empathy towards African nations. The young president accepted
Africa's neutralism and sympathized with their desire for total independence. He also
respected their sense of nationalism and tried to abstain from influencing Africa during
the Cold War era, Walton posits. Kennedy sponsored the Volta River Project due to his
empathy for Africa despite domestic resistance coupled with Nkrumah's attacks and
policies towards the United States. Kennedy sought to prove to Africans that the United
States did not demand political loyalty in return for economic and political aid. Walton
was silent on other factors that motivated Kennedy's agenda, such as the president's

9

relations with Nkrumah and K.A. Gbedemah. Moreover, Walton did not emphasize
how Edgar Kaiser's relations with Nkrumah influenced American support for the
Ghanaian Volta project.15
Scholars such as Thomas Noer, an expert in the history of the United States
foreign policy argues in his article, "The New Frontier and African Neutralism:
Kennedy, Nkrumah, and the Volta River Project," that ideological grounds influenced
the United States interactions with African nations during Kennedy's regime. America's
interactions with Africa considered the foreign and domestic policies of all African
nations. Whereas Kennedy had initially rejected the idea of supporting African nations,
he later changed his policies towards Africa in a short time. Noer avers that Kennedy
decided to support the Volta River Project in Ghana due to Nkrumah's acceptance of
America's conditions of economics, politics, and international cooperation.16
To Noer, Nkrumah's quest to build a dam to generate hydroelectric power and
process aluminum influenced his decision to seek financial support from the United
States. Before seeking America's assistance, Nkrumah requested support from the
British, who declined due to an excess of aluminum on the world market. Noer also
asserts that Nkrumah asked the World Bank and the Aluminum Company Limited of
Canada for their support. They too rejected the appeal due to the huge amount needed
for the development of the project. Nkrumah then sought for help from American
investors to finance the project. These investors showed some limited interest at the
initial stage due to the high cost involved in the building of the project. Nkrumah's

15

Richard J. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy (New
York: Viking Press, 1972), 3-8.
16
Thomas J. Noer, “The New Frontier and African Neutralism: Kennedy, Nkrumah, and the Volta
River Project,” Diplomatic History 8, no. 1 (1984): 61-62
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intent to industrialize Ghana influenced him to accept an offer in which Americans'
political and economic conditions were attached.17
Noer’s work posits that American support to the newly independent and
decolonized nations on the African continent, specifically Ghana, became the prime mover
in building Ghana as a modern nation.18 Noer's study reveals that the United States'
intervention in Africa during the Cold War era was guided by American interests over the
interests of the African nations though American aid supported the development of the
new African nations. As seen in the case of Ghana, the new nation in her desire for
financial support succumbed to the desires of the United States at the expense of their
neutrality and non-alignment policy. Although ideological policies shaped the interaction
between the two leaders, it seems the personal relations between Nkrumah and Kennedy
might have made things easy in the completion of the dam project. Noer did not emphasize
the role of personal relations in American-Ghanaian relationship, which this project will
address.
An African historian, Moses Awinsong in his project "The Power of the
Periphery: Aid, Mutuality and Cold War U.S.-Ghana Relations, 1957-1966," argues that
whereas the United States aided the new nation in building a modern nation; this took
place on an interactive plane as opposed to the United States intervening to promote its
version of modernity.19 The United States military, financial, and social assistance given
to Ghana were not solely guided by the United States’ policy to intervene in Africa.
Americans weighed the benefit they could derive from assisting African nations and the
contributions the United States could make towards the new nations. America benefited

Noer, “The New Frontier and African Neutralism,” 63.
See below for the above-mentioned scholars and their views on the United States Policies towards
African Nations during the Cold War Era.
19
Awinsong, “The Power of the Periphery: Aid, Mutuality and Cold War U. S-Ghana Relations, 19571966,” 1.
17
18
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from African nations such as Nigeria and Ghana, while Ghana, Nigeria, and some African
countries also aided the achievement of American political and economic interests in
Africa. Although the United States prioritized America's interest in its policies towards
Africa, the United States' assistance to the newly independent nation contributed to
transforming Ghana. Awinsong's project did not explicitly examine how America
contributed to transforming Ghana. Moreover, the role of the relations among the
statesmen of the two countries was not highlighted.
In his book, Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966, Diplomacy, Ideology, and the
New State, Scott W. Thompson, a British professor of International politics, argues that
the United States' intentions in Ghana were centered on the need to aid African nations to
develop. While Kennedy's administration sought to support Ghana, only nations that
shared a similar view with the United States Cold War policy were to receive foreign
assistance, Scott posits.20 According to Scott, before the United States intervention,
Nkrumah sought help from Middle Eastern countries. However, he was turned down since
these nations also perceived the cost of the Volta River Project to be too high. America's
commitment to supporting Ghana was enough to convince Nkrumah that the Volta scheme
could be developed, Scott avers.21
On July 1, 1960, during Ghana's Republic Day, Ghana received a letter from
Kennedy, which stated that the United States intended to support Ghana. Nonetheless, the
support was dependent on World Bank feasibility rulings. In September 1961, Kennedy
began to review Ghana's request to build the Volta River Project.22 Scott avers that from
early 1964, however, following Kennedy’s assassination, Nkrumah's attitude toward the
United States became more hostile. Kennedy's sympathetic policy was buried with him, and

Thompson W. Scott, Ghana’s Foreign Policy 1957-1966, Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State
(Princeton: University Press, 1969), 190.
21
Scott, Ghana’s Foreign Policy 1957-1966, 44.
22
Scott, Ghana’s Foreign Policy 1957-1966, 190.
20
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the transformation became manifested in Washington and Accra. Upon Kennedy’s death,
newly installed president Lyndon B. Johnson who expressed a strong dislike for the
uncertainty of African leaders, succeeded Kennedy.23 Scott highlights the role of personal
relations between Nkrumah and Kennedy in shaping Ghana's interaction with the United
States. The transition in the United States government, which ushered in Johnson, a man
who had less interest in African states since he believed they had little to offer, altered the
relationship which the two nations had built. Hence, the introduction of a new leader whose
relationship with Nkrumah was not perfect began to decline the relations between the two
countries. Personal relations overshadowed national ideology. This study will highlight how
personal relations played an instrumental role in Ghana-America relations during days when
national ideology could not work. Moreover, this study will go beyond state-state interaction
and discuss how private organizations and some individuals contributed to transforming
Ghana.
Although a growing number of scholars have contributed to the historiography of
the United States and Ghanaian relationships, they rarely addressed the interactions among
the private organizations and the interactions among some Ghanaian and American
individuals. Moreover, most of the existing literature fail to highlight the role of personal
relationships among statesmen in shaping United States-Ghanaian interactions. Historians
have generally focused on state-to-state interactions and interventions without addressing
the interactions and interventions of specific private institutions and individuals. This study
seeks to fill the gap in the historiography by addressing the intervention and interactional
roles of the leaders of the two nations and the private organizations that had interest in Ghana
during the first decade following the new nation’s independence. This thesis shows that not
only were U.S.-Ghanaian relations determined through state-to-state encounters, but also

23

Scott, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966, 300-301.
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through interactions between and among private organizations and individuals from both
countries. Also, the project shows how personal relations among various statesmen at times
overshadowed economics and ideology.

14

The Volta River Project
The Volta River Project is a large hydroelectric complex industry that
contributed to Ghana's key to industrial development, prosperity, and modernization.
The project consists of a high dam known as the Akosombo Dam, a powerhouse that
was scheduled to produce 589 MW electrical energy at the initial stage of the project,
and 883 MW by the final stage. The project included a transmission system that was
intended to produce electrical energy for the Tema Aluminum smelter, the mining
sector, and Ghanaians in the cities and villages in Southern Ghana.1 By 1966, the Volta
scheme became Ghana's only most significant investment in social overhead capital,
meant to galvanize the industrialization of Ghana.2 Initially, Ghanaians recognized that
such an ambitious undertaking depended on United States' support. The Tennessee
Valley Authority hydroelectric project, a grass-roots development, served as a model
for United States' overseas development projects, and shaped the readiness of the
United States to cooperate in the development of the Volta project.3 The Congo crisis,
Soviet's effort to disrupt America's interaction, opposition to the Kennedy
administration, and Kennedy's assassination delayed the completion of the project.
Nkrumah’s attacks on the United States, since he believed the West was willing to use
any means to gain power in Africa, also slowed down the development of the Volta
scheme.4

1

Ghana Information Services Department, Ghana Reborn (Ghana Information Service: New York,
December 1966), 58.
2
Kwamina Barnes, Economics of Volta River Project (Legon, Ghana: University Bookshop, 1966), 2.
3
David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American
World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 14-40, 65.
4
Letter, President Eisenhower to President Nkrumah,” August 7, 1960, Foreign Relations of the United
States (hereafter FRUS), 1958-1960, vol.14, eds. Glenn W. LaFantasie and Harriet Dashiell Schwar
(Washington, DC: US Gov. Print. Off, 1992), doc. 298.
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Nonetheless, the development of the project succeeded because of personal
relationships—rather than relationships that were driven solely by ideological or
economical considerations. The Ghanaian culture of openness and the willingness to
corporate while doing things themselves shaped Ghana-American relations. Even from
some Canadians’ perspective, Ghanaians value the act of greeting and their ritual of
greeting is lengthier than what exists in Canada. Hand shaking is a special act in Ghana
and the use of the left hand is culturally unacceptable in Ghana. Ghanaians usually ask
about the well-being of families, friends, and even foreigners. Ghanaians are seen to be
generally helpful and welcoming to even strangers. Over the years, Ghana has been
identified as a friendly country and a region more welcoming for first time travelers in
Africa.

5

On the other hand, the American dream of helping all people to achieve a

better life shaped the United States’ foreign policies during Kennedy’s administration.
The relationships between Nkrumah and Kennedy, and Nkrumah and Edgar Kaiser
allowed for the development of the project.
Edgar Fosburgh Kaiser Sr., born on July 29, 1908 was an American capitalist
who became the head of the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, and
contributed massively to the development of the Volta scheme. This chapter argues that
Ghana's interactions with the United States during the first decade of the new nation
helped in launching Ghana towards industrialization. America supported the newly
independent nation's goal of industrialization. Ghana's development of the Volta River
Project and its facets created employment, and scientific and technological progress.
This chapter presents a historical overview of the Volta River Project, Nkrumah's vision
for it, the purpose for the project, and United States-Ghanaian interactions in setting up

Global Affairs Canada, “Ghana” Accessed on May 19, 2020 https://www.international.gc.ca/cilcai/country_insights-apercus_pays/ci-ic_gh.aspx?lang=eng#cn-8.
5
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the hydroelectric project. State-to-state interactions are examined together with the
personal relations among statesmen and how they played a role in completing the Volta
River scheme. Kaiser Company, an American aluminum company, is examined
together with other corporations that contributed towards the completion of the project.
Historical overview of the Volta River Project
The idea of constructing the Volta River Project first came into being through
the discoveries of Sir Albert Kitson, director of the Gold Coast Geological Survey, an
initiative based in London. Though on a mission to discover new mineral reserves in
Ghana, he discovered the site that was later used for the development of the Volta
scheme. After the formation of the Gold Coast Department of Geological Surveys in
1913, Kitson journeyed to the Gold Coast as the first director of the Geological Surveys.
The Gold Coast Department of Geological Surveys charged Kitson with discovering
other mineral reserves in the mountains and forests of the Gold Coast, aside from the
existence of gold.6 Kitson discovered the wealthy industrial diamond deposits at
Akwatia, a region that is still a rough diamond center in present-day Ghana. He also
found iron ore deposits located at Shieni, near what was to become Lake Volta.
Credit must be given to Mr. Duncan E. Rose, a private expatriate geologist, who
chanced on a copy of Kitson's proposal in a public library in Johannesburg in 1938 and
flew to Ghana a few months later. Rose re-assessed the proposal to build the Volta
scheme. He considered the recommendations to build the Volta project after making
minor changes and adding a proposal for constructing a harbor at Ada to facilitate the
movement of deep ocean vessels. Unfortunately, the outbreak of the Second World War
disrupted any further steps and the scientific research needed for the development of
the project. In 1944, work on the project resumed when English investor Duncan Rose
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established a company called West African Aluminum Limited and obtained the right
to mine bauxite from the colonial government.7
Even after Ghana’s independence, Britain wanted to support the development
of the Volta scheme and desired to benefit from the Volta scheme’s profit. Nonetheless,
in 1958, the British Government rescinded its decision to support the project following
an increase in the British bank rate, which made the funding needed to support the
project expensive. Moreover, the low value of aluminum on the world market
discouraged the colonial government from supporting the project. Hitherto, the British
government had withdrawn from the Aswan dam project in Egypt. The Aswan High
Dam development which began in 1960 under the leadership of Egyptian leader Gamal
Abdel Nasser was also scheduled to enhance the generation of electricity, provide water
to Egyptians, and reduce flooding. Britain’s withdrawal from the Aswan Dam was due
to the high cost involved in building the Egyptian project and the limited benefits
Britain was to gain in return. In the case of Ghana, the colonial government expressed
similar reluctancy to support the project with huge funds and that prevented any real
development of the project, thereby pushing Nkrumah to consult the United States for
its assistance in developing the project. Nkrumah’s desire to complete the Volta project
made him use any possible means to gain support for the development of the project.8
Nkrumah and the Volta River Project
Following Ghana's independence in 1957 and the election of Nkrumah as the
prime minister, Nkrumah became the pioneer for the project, and the project entered a
new phase. During the 1951 electioneering campaign, Nkrumah had promised
Ghanaians that he would complete the Volta River Project when elected to office.
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The colonial government was initially interested in building the project, but it
was motivated more by the intent of making a profit for the British government than to
industrialize the colony. Hence, it withdrew when it realized the cost involved in
developing the Volta scheme was higher. The colonial government envisaged
developing a scheme that would increase its foreign reserve and maximize profit. The
colonial authority did not prioritize the interest of the colony to industrialize and
transform as an African nation in the building of the project. The British government
pulled back in 1958 when the expenses for the project increased, following the fall in
aluminum price in 1956.9 Under the colonial authority, Ghana's economic ties with
other nations were limited. Natural resources and all projects were to serve the interest
of the colonial authority, not Ghana nor Ghanaians. Kwame Nkrumah's central goal for
the project was to create an automated program that could transform Ghana into an
industrialized and modernized nation within a short time following political
independence. Nkrumah wanted to make Ghana economically independent in order to
make the nation's political independence meaningful. He believed political
independence would be useless without economic independence. Nkrumah believed
that any form of national development was dependent on economic independence.
Nkrumah sought to encourage the development of factories to aid Ghanaian businesses
in the production of commodities needed for Ghanaians' consumption.10
While Nkrumah had declared policies of non-alignment and positive neutrality,
he was aware the new nation could not finance the project alone. The reluctance of the
British government pushed Nkrumah to rely on support from other foreign powers. The
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United States was ready to support Ghana to prevent the new country from soliciting
assistance from the Soviets, whose national ideology was opposite to the United States’
own. Moreover, America wanted to use Ghana as the nursery for the cultivation of the
United States capitalist ideology.
The greatest challenge to the creation of the project had to do with financing
the project. The development of the project coincided with a period when interest rates
on loans and the duration for loan repayments had become challenging. Moreover,
production power temporarily outran the world's demand for aluminum.11 The project
was delayed due to the various difficulties until the various leaders overcame them and
moved to begin the development of the Volta scheme.12
The Purpose of the Volta River Project
On Tuesday, February 21, 1961, Nkrumah appeared before the National
Assembly and discussed the Volta River Project. He called for a debate to endorse the
plan for implementation to expedite negotiations to facilitate the beginning of the
project in 1961. According to Nkrumah, the industrial sector of a nation's economy
depended on a high and dependable source of power, just as European nations, Canada,
Russia, America, and other nations' industrialization had depended on the creation of
power.13
Nkrumah believed the purpose of the project was to supply power and
transmission systems that would relieve Ghana of one obstacle on its road to
industrialization. Power would be evenly distributed for sale to every firm in Ghana.
Besides, the supply of adequate and reliable sources of power was scheduled to move
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machinery and provide power process materials. Also, a constant supply of power
would provide electric energy to operate chemical processes and to supply power for
the aluminum smelter and other materials.14 The American Tennessee Valley Authority
(T.V.A.) project became a popular model for development globally. The T.V.A.
became a model for America's modernization of the "Third World" during the Cold
War. The Tennessee project led to the development of dams and other technologies to
enhance modernization. Electrification projects had been developed along rivers in the
United States, Vietnam, and other places as sources of power for modernization. The
T.V.A. was viewed to address the needs and help solve the problems of developing
countries.15
The smelting industry, and the jobs it was to create would also provide a new
industry for the Ghanaian economy. The aluminum smelter was to reduce the
unemployment situation in Ghana. It would employ the services of about 1,500 people
when it begins operation. Besides, foreign companies would be responsible for the
payment of company taxes to the Ghanaian government. At the same time, the Volta
scheme would as well pay the Volta River Authority about 2.5 million pounds per
annum for electricity supply.16 Also, the development of the scheme would improve
Ghana's foreign exchange rates from sales derived from the operations of the smelter.
Ghana would be exporting electricity and materials provided from the operations of the
smelter. The development of the smelter would introduce alumina powder that
produced aluminum metal. Alumna powder would be produced through the
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transmission of a large amount of electricity through the powder to melt out metal. The
process generates electricity.17
The Kaiser Corporation and the Volta River Project
The Kaiser corporation contributed immensely to the development of the Volta
scheme. The Kaiser corporation was not just an aluminum company; the Kaiser
company also built hydroelectric plants. Moreover, the Kaiser company had an interest
in steel, coking coal, and fabricating steel. Additionally, it produced other essential
products such as industrial chemicals, glass fiber, refractories, agricultural chemicals,
zinc, lead, gypsum, and cement. As a private organization, the Kaiser group contributed
immensely towards the development of the Volta River project.18
The Kaiser Corporation came onto the scene through the recommendation of
the International Co-operation Administration which called for a reassessment of the
Volta River project. The International Co-operation Administration recommended that
an engineering company thoroughly examined the engineering requirement and
presented the potential economic benefits of the project. The Kaiser corporation
assessed the project and issued a Reassessment Report that recommended the
construction of the Dam at Akosombo instead of Ajena. Moreover, the report
recommended the development of a hydroelectric station at Bui. The government of
Ghana had already entered into an agreement with the Soviets for both designing and
the construction of a hydroelectric station at Bui. The initial idea of the Soviets’ project
sought to provide maximum electricity supply from the dam to an aluminum smelter
and a small section of the Ghanaian population. The Kaiser Reassessment Report
recommended the creation of a national electricity provider. The national electricity
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provider would supply a significant part of Southern Ghana-Tema via Accra, Cape
Coast, Takoradi, Tarkwa, Dunkwa, Kumasi, Koforidua, and return to Akosombo.19
President Nkrumah established personal relations with Henry Kaiser, the head of the
Kaiser firm, after the Kaiser company had presented the Reassessment Report. The
relationship between Nkrumah and Kaiser shaped the Volta project for the next decade.
Nkrumah's personality as an outspoken, robust, dynamic, ambitious, innovative,
friendly, and goal-oriented leader were traits that Henry Kaiser also bore. These
connections between the two leaders sustained their relationship and allowed Ghana to
achieve the total support of the Kaiser Corporation, a private organization.
Following the establishment of rapport with the Kaiser corporation, Nkrumah
asked the company to form an aluminum company in Ghana that would make use of
the power produced by the dam project. Nkrumah's request later resulted in the creation
of the Volta Aluminum Company (VALCO).20
The Kaiser Cooperation had its own ambitions: maximizing of profits. This
motivated the company to support the development of the Volta River Project. The
Kaiser group envisaged contributing to Ghana's industrialization. Nevertheless, the
company prioritized its own profit maximization. The Kaiser corporation's involvement
in the project would ensure the production of low-cost hydroelectricity. It would also
provide access to an ample supply of Ghana's bauxites. The electricity to be produced
would be accessible to all Ghanaians at a cheaper rate. The Kaiser corporation's access
to the Ghanaian bauxite would maximize the newly independent country's foreign
exchange and shape Ghana towards industrialization.21
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Henry Kaiser retired at age 74 in 1956, and his son Edgar Kaiser became the
leader of the Kaiser companies. Henry, however, continued to be active in the decision
making of the Kaiser industries. On July 28, 1958, Nkrumah had his first meeting with
Edgar Kaiser. Like his father, Edgar was a robust, innovative, and dynamic person.
Nkrumah's possession of these traits helped sustain his relations with Edgar. Nkrumah's
popularity inside and outside Africa due to his nationalistic activities in Africa and other
“Third World” nations aided the building of trust for Nkrumah. During their initial
meeting, Nkrumah and Kaiser quickly built a rapport. During the conversation between
Nkrumah and Edgar Kaiser, a member of the Kaiser Corporation said that Nkrumah
speaks like Edgar's father, Henry Kaiser. Nkrumah heard the comment and broke into
laughter. The personal relations built between Edgar Kaiser and Nkrumah at their first
meeting was influential in the development of the new country's industrialization
ambitions. During this period, Halcrow, a British private firm, had begun building the
Tema project, and it connected firmly with the Kaiser Cooperation. Both companies
equally sought to maximize profit by associating with the industrialization process.
Nkrumah inspired Kaiser with his enthusiasm, and that made Kaiser develop a keen
interest in the development of the project, both to benefit his own company and to
modernize Ghana. Nkrumah and Kaiser's relations galvanized the scheme after 1958 as
the Kaiser corporation maximize profits while contributing to Ghana's launch towards
modernization.22
Representatives of the Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Corporation, together with
the Aluminum Limited of Canada (ALCAN), Reynolds Metals, the Aluminum
Company of America (ALCOA), and Olin Mathieson, met in September 1959 and
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formed a limited liability firm which became known as the Volta Aluminum
Company(VALCO) to ensure the development of the Volta scheme.23 In December
1959, President Nkrumah and D.A. Rhodes, the then president of the Kaiser Aluminum
and Chemical Corporation, on behalf of the VALCO Company, signed a "letter of
intent" stating that VALCO had agreed on paper to partake in the Volta River Project.
The agreement between the government of Ghana and VALCO shows some level of
changes in the Ghanaian government's trade policies. The Legislative House had
approved and made provision for the encouragement of private companies to invest in
Ghana. Since VALCO, a private enterprise was a world-renowned aluminum company,
the agreement signaled to the outside world the willingness of the Ghanaian
government to partner with private institutions. The government of Ghana's contract
with VALCO, a private company, helped erase the misconception of those who had
doubts about such a possibility.24 The VALCO company, which the Kaiser corporation
founded contributed immensely to Ghana's industrialization through the production of
aluminum ingots.25 Although the economic interests of the Kaiser company were taken
into consideration in the establishment of VALCO, Ghana's goal for modernization and
industrialization materialized through the pivotal roles the Kaiser corporation, a private
firm, played in Ghana.26
Edgar Kaiser still supported the project despite the huge figures needed to
finance the scheme. Edgar's relationship with Nkrumah made the Kaiser company
support the project irrespective of the amount needed in the development of the project.
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The Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) and Olin Mathieson in East Alton,
Illinois, had supported the project as a means of making a profit and to help Ghana's
goal of becoming economically independent. However, in early 1960, both ALCOA
and Olin Mathieson stepped away from their decision to support the project. These
companies rescinded their decisions due to the high cost involved in funding the project.
The Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Corporation, and Reynolds Metals, which still showed
interest in contributing to the project, arrived at a consensus to construct and run the
smelter at the cost of 90 percent and 10 percent, respectively.27
Due to the need to finance the project, the World Bank entered the picture. After
the World Bank had investigated the plan, it recommended that the highest amount
Ghana could borrow was £190 million. Such a recommendation raised concerns due to
the enormous amount needed to develop the project. Kaiser, as the head of the Kaiser
company, expressed interest in supporting Nkrumah in transforming Ghana into a
modernized and industrialized nation to compete with other developed countries.
Nevertheless, he protected the economic interests of the Kaiser company. As a private
company that sought to maximize profit, the profitability of the Volta scheme as well
influenced the Kaiser corporation's support for the project while Edgar Kaiser, the
leader of the Kaiser cooperation’s relationship with Nkrumah also contributed towards
ensuring the development of the Volta project concurrently.28
The Kaiser company invested millions of dollars in the project to ensure its
realization. The company hoped to receive an excellent return for the amount invested
while supporting Ghana's transformation through scientific and technological
innovation.29 The Kaiser corporation's interest in having access to aluminum and
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Ghana's bauxite also shaped its commitment to support the project. At the same time,
the company supported the launching of Ghana's electricity development program and
the need for industrialization. As a public corporation, the desire for profits and the
mutual relationship Nkrumah established with each of the leaders of the Kaiser
organization, guided the Kaiser company’s support for the Volta scheme. Even in times
when the United States government wanted to back out due to Nkrumah's association
with the Soviets, Kaiser continued to support the project and even advised the United
States government to support the project as a fight against Soviet penetration.30 Ghana's
drive to industrialization, a mark of a modern nation, was spearheaded through the
continued backing of the Kaiser firm, through personal relations between Nkrumah and
the respective leaders of the Kaiser corporation in the first decade of the newly
independent country.
The United States Government and the Volta River Project
United States government’s interest in contributing to the Volta River Project
in Ghana began in the mid-1950s. Although political, economic, and ideological
reasons shaped the United States' intent in supporting the project, personal relations
between Nkrumah and the United States’ presidents over time as well guided the
American assistance in Ghana's transition to industrialization. According to Sir Robert
Gillman Allen Jackson, the British appointed special commissioner of the preparatory
commission of the Volta project, political factors primarily motivated the United States
to be involved in the Volta River Project. Ghana was the first nation in sub-Saharan
Africa to gain its independence. Since the United States sought to gain political, social,
and economic influence in Africa, supporting the project became paramount to such an
opportunity. America's vision to gain influence in Africa grew to its zenith following
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the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956. The Suez Crisis emerged after Britain and America
rescinded their decision to finance the construction of the Aswan dam project. Gamal
Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president nationalized the Suez Canal and that generated
crisis in the Middle East. Hitherto, the canal was controlled by the British and the
French. The Soviets supported the creation of the Aswan dam in Egypt following the
withdrawal of the British and Americans.31
In March 1954, a group of American businessmen under the leadership of R.V.
Wood and A. Hehmeyer came to Ghana under the United States government's requests.
Through the United States Point Four Technical Assistance Program and with the
acceptance from the Ghanaian government, the team was charged with the
responsibility of examining trade and investment possibilities in Ghana. The Ghanaian
culture of hospitality and America's desire to modernize the new nation while projecting
its national interests shaped cooperation between the American businessmen and
Ghanaian officials.32 Specifically, the group envisaged gaining access to, and making
known, the economic opportunities in Ghana to promote the creation and expansion of
African business firms. The United States government’s contribution to expanding
Ghanaian firms would help transform the limited Ghanaian economy into an
industrialized, global one. Moreover, the team also had an interest in the existence of
laws related to the creation and managing of capital and sought to align trade laws with
the needs and interests of the emerging private economies in Ghana. The modernization
of a nation was equally dependent on the development of private economies that
interwove with the mission of the American businessmen who came to Ghana to discuss
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the Volta scheme and other economic projects.33 In January 1955, the team presented a
report to the United States government. The best investment opportunity in Ghana, the
team concluded, was the creation of hydroelectricity and aluminum production. The
team believed the development of the electricity project would provide Ghanaians with
electricity, hasten industrialization in Ghana as a tool for modernization, and benefit
the American interests.34
In 1956, a new development ushered in a new phase in the relationship between
Eisenhower and Nkrumah. In October 1956, the Ghanaian Finance Minister, Komla
Agbeli Gbedemah and his secretary, an African American, after attending the
Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ meeting in Ottawa, visited the United States. They
entered one of the Howard Johnson roadside restaurants in Delaware for a glass of iced
orange juice. The waitress, supported by the restaurant manager, told Gbedemah that
people of color were not permitted to be served at the counter, although he could be
allowed to buy something and take it outside the eating establishment. Gbedemah said
to the manager, “The people here are of lower social status than I am but they can drink
here, and we can’t. You can keep the orange juice and the change, but this is not the
last you have heard of this.”35
The press got hold of the story and escalated the incident. President Eisenhower
and Vice-President Nixon moved to apologize for the situation, hence, they invited Mr.
Gbedemah for breakfast at the White House. This unfortunate incident became pivotal
in shaping Ghana's relations with the United States and contributed to the new country's
road to industrialization and modernization. Eisenhower, who was interested in what
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he had heard about the Volta River Project, asked Gbedemah to provide further details
about the project. Initially, the Eisenhower administration was reluctant to support
Ghana's ambition for the development of the Volta project until Congressional
Democrats criticized the Eisenhower government. Congress believed Eisenhower's
administration was not interested in Africa and that would make the United States lose
Africa to the Soviets. The criticisms pushed Eisenhower to build a strong relationship
with Nkrumah as a preparatory stage to American support in Ghana's industrialization.
While initial discussions and relations were between President Eisenhower and
Gbedemah, President Nkrumah's relationship with Eisenhower was established through
the orange juice incident. Nkrumah wrote to President Eisenhower some days after the
incident and indicated he and his members were passionate about the Volta River
Project and viewed it as the vehicle for Ghana’s modernization. He also noted that his
government was ready to negotiate with any company or government. Nkrumah sent
President Eisenhower copies of the Preparatory Commission's Report to study.36
With Ghana's Independence Day celebration scheduled for March 6, 1957,
Eisenhower's relation with Nkrumah, together with America's interest in Ghana,
persuaded Eisenhower to appoint Vice President Nixon to represent America. The vice
president told Ghanaians during a press conference that the United States’ government
was interested in the Volta River Project, and that the American government desired to
assist in modernizing Ghana. Nixon added that he had already discussed with President
Nkrumah the proposed Volta River Project.37
Nkrumah officially sought friendly assistance from the United States,
beginning with discussions with President Dwight Eisenhower in October 1957.
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Eisenhower showed interest in the project and asked the International Co-operation
Administration to aid in making the project look attractive. The International Cooperation Administration recommended a re-examination of the project to assess the
engineering part of the creation of the Volta River Project and to examine the economic
benefits of the project. Eisenhower invited Nkrumah to visit Washington. Nkrumah's
visit to Washington became the first time a guest from a developing country visited
Washington, an act that was influenced by the cordial relations built between the two
presidents.38
In July 1958, Nkrumah made an official visit to the United States. Prior to
Nkrumah’s visit, Douglas Dillon, the then undersecretary of state for economic and
agriculture affairs, asked Edgar Kaiser, and Chad Calhoun, the vice president of Kaiser
Industries, to study the prospects of the project. Following a detailed study of the
project, Edgar indicated that it was economically viable for the United States and
private firms. Edgar told Eisenhower that the Volta scheme would benefit the American
government and private industries. It would as well launch Ghana to the road of
modernization through industrialization and an improvement in Ghana's foreign
exchange rate.39
Although aluminum was abundant at the world market, Eisenhower granted his
backing to support Ghana in the development of the Volta River scheme due to relations
he had established with Nkrumah and the need to forestall Soviet influence in Ghana.
From the initial stage of the development of the Volta scheme, Nkrumah had
established connection with Eisenhower and even asked Eisenhower to use his personal
influence to persuade Henry Kaiser to found a company to support the building of the
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aluminum project.40 Compared to colonial authority forms of support meant to benefit
the colonial powers only, Eisenhower's support had been guided by Ghana's need for
industrialization while protecting America's national interests. He was aware of how
the clumsiness of American and British policy resulted in the Soviets having power
over the Aswan Dam in Egypt.
Eisenhower wanted to subvert any Soviet penetration into Africa.41 Speaking
on the Volta scheme during Nkrumah's visit in 1958, President Eisenhower restated that
the United States would continue to examine the possibilities of making the
development of the project work. Eisenhower added that the United States desired to
help the new country in transforming into a developed country through
industrialization. He assured Nkrumah he had not forgotten Ghana and the Volta
scheme. Nkrumah acknowledged the United States' interest and indicated his
government would be appreciative of any support it received from the United States
government even as Ghana also explored the possibilities of developing the project
through the support of private aluminum companies. Even if the private companies
were not interested in the project, Nkrumah was optimistic about the project's economic
viability, its role in Ghana's modernization, and the potential to attract aluminum
companies. Besides, the scheme would provide a cheap source of power upon its
completion. Eisenhower asked if there were other services the project might provide to
the new country. Nkrumah answered that the project would be used for small industries
and agricultural purposes, which were also steps toward modernization.42
Eisenhower compared the Volta project to the Rural Electrification
Administration, the project instituted by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936 to help reduce
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unemployment through the production of electricity to remote areas. He described how
the Rural Electrification Administration project, like the Volta scheme, had provided
electricity to rural areas and promoted industrialization. President Eisenhower proposed
the project should begin with the small dam at Abouya, which already had been
discussed. Nkrumah responded that the dam at Abuoya was feasible and equally
economically beneficial in transforming the new nation towards its goal of
modernizing. However, Nkrumah informed Eisenhower the site for the dam at Abuoya
was not close to the bauxite deposits. Nkrumah told Eisenhower he hoped the United
States support Ghana in its industrial development. Nkrumah anticipated American’s
support to Ghana would follow the same path as the United States' support in the
Philippines. The United States supported the Philippines in building the Filipino water
supply system, which supplied sanitized water from its construction in 1946.43
The year 1960 ushered in new troubles that affected the Volta River Project.
The Congo revolution against Belgian colonial rule, which Nkrumah supported
discouraged many corporations from investing in any project in Africa. Shortly after
Congo had gained its independence, an insurrection broke out which marked the
emergence of the Congo crisis. Lumumba appealed to both the United States and the
United Nations Organization to gain support to subdue Belgian colonial authority.
However, both declined to offer support to Lumumba. Lumumba then turned to the
Soviets for support and this created unrest in Congo since the United States, Belgium,
President Joseph Kasa-Vubu, Congolese president, and chief of staff, Joseph-Desire
Mobutu opposed Soviets support for Lumumba. Lumumba was imprisoned and
murdered. Nkrumah supported the nationalist, Patrice Lumumba and criticized the
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West’s support for the Belgians in the Congo crisis, thereby creating more problems.
In July 1960, Ghana had become a republic, and that granted more power to Nkrumah
as some restrictions on Nkrumah's presidential actions were removed. Nkrumah
continued to attack the West for their involvement in the Congo crisis though he needed
the United States support in developing the Volta scheme.44
Amidst the Congo crisis and Nkrumah’s bitterness against the West, GhanaianAmerican relations did not deteriorate. On August 7, 1960, Eisenhower sent a letter to
Nkrumah, indicating the United States continued to have great interest in the project
and believed it was time for negotiations to take place with the aluminum companies
and the World Bank. In the absence of Mr. Douglas Dillon, the United States Under
Secretary of State who had proposed cooperation with the International Bank for both
reconstruction and reviewing of the project, Eisenhower appointed Mr. Edwin M.
Martin, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, to continue with
the discussions on the project. Gbedemah, the finance minister who was continuously
negotiating for the Volta River Project informed the United States representatives about
Nkrumah's position towards the Soviets. The Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary for
Political Affairs Raymond Hare, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Department,
Grady Upton, were to discuss the development of the project with the Ghanaian finance
minister, Mr. Gbedemah in the following week. Eisenhower concluded in the letter that
these state officials and the American government were pleased to cooperate with
Gbedemah, and they would discuss plans towards developing the project with the intent
of launching Ghana as an industrialized nation with a high level of energy power for
industrial activities.45
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Gbedemah visited Washington, and after extensive negotiations, he returned to
Ghana with an amount of £1.5 million, which was below the expected target needed in
developing the project. Gbedemah feared Nkrumah might be angry and grant the project
to the Soviets.46 However, on November 17, 1960, Gbedemah signed a contract with
the Volta Aluminum Company after a lengthly negotiation with state officials.
American support was needed for the success of the Volta River scheme. Nkrumah and
his officials believed Ghana's transition to modernity and the desire to transform the
young nation into an industrialized nation was dependent on support from one or the
other of the superpowers. The Soviets were equally interested in supporting the project
as they envisaged contributing towards Ghana's modernization while projecting their
communist interests. Rumors of Soviets’ interest in supporting the project did not lure
Nkrumah in, as he had faith in the United States to support the project. While this had
been Nkrumah's position, he was ready to accept any offer from the Soviets in building
a steel mill, about which United States companies were not interested, nor did they seek
to compete with the Soviets.47
Americans became embittered when it came to the public that most of the
Convention People’s Party (C.P.P.) ministers had been influenced by Tawia Adamafio
and the C.P.P. ministers wanted the Volta project to be given to the Soviets. Adamafio,
a member of the C.P.P, was the General Secretary of the C.P.P. In 1960, Nkrumah
appointed him as the Minister of Information and Broadcasting and as a Minister for
Presidential Affairs concurrently. His position as a presidential affairs minister made
him influential in Nkrumah's government. Adamafio and John Tettegah, the leader of
the Ghanaian Trade Union Council, visited the Soviet Union in 1960. Kruschev showed
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his readiness to build the Volta project if the West delayed. The Soviets offered longterm credit funds of 14.7 million Euros to Ghana. The Soviets' offer made Adamafio
believe the East could assist the Volta development in a short time.48
Nkrumah announced during the National Assembly debate on January 1961
that the Soviets had proposed to build the Bui Dam on the Black Volta. Clearly,
Nkrumah’s intent was to gain support from both the East and West, with which he saw
no problem, as he continued to proclaim his ideology of neutrality and positive nonalignment.49
A new administration under the leadership of Kennedy was ushered into office
in January 1961. Kennedy’s arrival on the scene transformed the Ghanaian American
relations for the better. Kennedy came into office determined to usher in a new phase
of United States foreign policy in Africa. Kennedy had a great interest in Africa even
before his presidential campaign. During the Algerian war of revolution against France,
Kennedy gave a speech detailing how Algeria must be freed from French imperialism.
He had declared a fresh tolerance of neutralism. Kennedy's administration perceived
American's aid to modernize Ghana as a test for the new dynamism of American policy
towards Africa. Kennedy was determined to make the United States contribute to
industrializing Ghana. He aimed at rectifying the damage he believed the Eisenhower
administration had caused in Congo due to how Eisenhower handled the Congo crisis.
Nkrumah had established a personal relationship with Kennedy even before Kennedy
was voted into power as a president. Nkrumah had initially written to Senator Kennedy
asking for support in the launch of Ghana towards industrialization. He wrote again

48
49

Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World, 160-62.
Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World, 158-159.

36

after the Democrat had won the election. Nkrumah declared that Africans had hope in
the new administration.50
The murder of Lumumba on January 17, 1961 derailed Kennedy's vision. In
Africa, it was confirmed the Central Intelligence Agency had spearheaded the murder
of Lumumba. American C.I.A. supported Joseph Kasavubu and his subordinate,
Colonel Joseph Mobutu, with weapons and this contributed to the overthrown of
Lumumba.51 Lumumba's death worsened American relations in Africa. The Congo
crisis commanded the most significant attention of President Kennedy. Kennedy
worked along with the United Nations and Nkrumah and they established a
constitutional government and established Congo as a nation. Once the Congo Crisis
eased, Kennedy's attention shifted back to the Volta project. Nevertheless, Nkrumah
was not happy about losing his close friend, Patrice Emery Lumumba. Kennedy's
relations with Nkrumah made them put aside the Congo crisis and continue with the
goal of modernizing Ghana through the Volta scheme.52
Kennedy was determined to win Africans over by supporting the Volta River
Project. He anticipated that America's support for Ghana's Volta scheme would attract
Africans to American policies. President Kennedy believed that one of the ways to gain
the trust of the "Third World" was to establish personal relations with their leaders. He
formed friendly relations with the likes of Sekou Toure, the Guinean president, and
Kwame Nkrumah. Kennedy's relations with Nkrumah shaped Ghana's modernization
goal for the next decade.53 Kennedy believed that moral diplomacy was a tool to
enhance positive foreign relations. Barbara Ward, the wife of Sir Robert Jackson, was
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the brain behind Kennedy's intent to support Ghana. Ward was a Carnegie Fellow at
Harvard who had access to the Kennedy power base situated in Boston. Moreover, she
had met Nkrumah as a friend, and her relations with the leader made her develop trust
towards Nkrumah and encouraged Kennedy to sponsor the project. Kaiser also advised
Kennedy's administration regarding the Cold War in Africa. Kaiser believed that the
United States' support for the Volta River Project as a tool to launch the newly
independent nation to industrialization would leave an indelible mark on the
continent.54
On the other hand, Francis H. Russell, the American ambassador in Accra,
offered up a discouraging report about perceptions of the United States in Ghana. He
described an anti-American campaign carried on by the Ghanaian press and Ghana's
shift towards the Soviets. Russell believed the United States' support for the Volta River
Project would mean a reward for Ghana's anti-American attitude. Due to the Ghanaian
press attacks, Russell believed America should not support Ghana in the modernization
process. Moreover, Russell urged the United States not to underrate Nkrumah's anger
over the Congo crisis. He added that Ghanaian conservatives had expressed hatred for
Nkrumah. However, he cautioned that the United States' withdrawal from the Volta
River Project would drive Ghana towards the Soviets' bloc. Russell believed Ghana's
strong desire for modernization would push Nkrumah to the Soviets' side if America
decided not to support the Volta project.55
The end of February 1961 witnessed significant events in Ghana. Chad
Calhoun, Kaiser company’s vice president and Sir Robert Gillman Allen Jackson, a
United Nations administrator made a trip to Ghana to discuss the Volta River Project
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with Nkrumah. The Soviets’ penetration and involvement in Africa were heightened
when Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev visited Ghana in early 1961 to discuss Eastern
bloc policies toward Africa with Nkrumah. Brezhnev's visit and the banquet in his
honor coincided with Calhoun and Jackson's visit to Ghana and their interview with
Nkrumah. The banquet signaled Soviets' interest in contributing to Ghana's
modernization. During the banquet, Nkrumah declared that Lumumba's death had made
him understand how determined the West was in achieving its agenda in Africa.56
Brezhnev's visit to Ghana alarmed the West and prompted the United States to
develop policies to subvert Soviets' penetration. Doing so required the United States to
contribute towards launching Ghana to industrialization by supporting the Volta
Project.57 Ward and Calhoun, in a memorandum to Kennedy, advised the president to
win Nkrumah's heart from the Soviets when Nkrumah comes for his scheduled visit to
Washington. Meanwhile, Nkrumah had explicitly stated that Africans no longer trusted
the West because Africans believed the Western powers were bringing forth a new form
of colonialism. Nkrumah cited the incident in Katanga in which the Belgian government
and the Union Minière had supported Moise Tshombe, the Congolese politician.
Nkrumah realized the West was determined to establish control over Africa. Such a
perception from Nkrumah meant the United States was not going to take it easy in
winning his heart. Nevertheless, Nkrumah believed there must be cooperation between
the West and Africa. While he had expressed distrust in America, his vision for
modernizing Ghana sustained his interactions with Kennedy.58
Americans became more concerned when Ghana entered into an economic
agreement with Yugoslavia when Josip Broz Tito, president of the Socialist Federal
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Republic of Yugoslavia, on March 1, 1961, visited Ghana. Gbedemah on the other
hand, had been attacked by Adamafio's group and was at the point of clashing with
Nkrumah. During his stay in Washington as he prepared for Nkrumah's visit, Gbedemah
informed Walt Rostow, the American National Security adviser, of his fear of Ghana's
shift towards the Soviets. He suggested Kennedy and Nkrumah alone should meet,
barring Nkrumah's advisers from the meeting. Gbedemah thought due to Nkrumah's
relations with Kennedy and the United States president's desire to contribute towards
Ghanaian modernization, a discussion between the two presidents would be smooth
compared to having discussions in the presence of other influencers of Nkrumah's
government. Gbedemah believed Geoffrey Bing, Nkrumah's constitutional advisor,
whom Russell had described as the most pro-communist among Nkrumah's advisers,
would come along with Nkrumah in Washington. He alarmed Rostow by telling him of
the growing influence of the Soviets in Ghana through Bing and the influential Russian
ambassador, Aleksey Alekseievich Rodionov.59
In March 1961, President Nkrumah visited the United States en route to the
United Nations General Assembly meeting. He met President Kennedy on March 8,
1961, and the two presidents had a detailed discussion about the Volta River Project at
the White House.60 Before their encounter, Barbara Ward sent a note to warn Kennedy
that Nkrumah was temperamental and susceptible to changes in the Cold War era. Ward
asserted that though Nkrumah had recognized the importance of the United States in
transforming Ghana as an industrialized country, he would never compromise his nonalignment position and neutrality for America's support for the project. Kennedy
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listened to Ward's advice, and Nkrumah visited the White House in March without any
of his ministers.61
Nkrumah did not hide his personality. He gave a blurred presentation of his
opinions during his interaction with Kennedy. Kennedy shifted to Nkrumah's proSoviet attitude and anti-western campaigns and how that had hindered the United States'
financial support for the Volta River Project. Nkrumah responded that he was not a
communist; instead, he noted, it was just easier to gain assistance from the East to
industrialize Ghana compared to the West. Kennedy also believed it was easier for a
“Third World” country to gain support from the East to industrialize than gaining
assistant from the West, yet he wanted the Volta Project to be developed through
American assistance. The relationship between the two leaders eased their discussions
though each had reservations about the other's reaction. President Kennedy was ready
to assist Nkrumah's Ghana to develop the project as an instrument for industrialization.
Kennedy assured Nkrumah the amount of $30 million, which had been frozen under
Eisenhower's administration, would be unfrozen. At the same time, all other hurdles
would be resolved. Kennedy made a financial commitment to launch Ghana to the path
of modernization without solely prioritizing America's economic interest.62
Kennedy extended his relationship with Nkrumah to include the first family.
Upon ending the meeting, Kennedy went along with Nkrumah to meet the first lady and
daughter, Caroline. Nkrumah was powerfully overwhelmed with the reception given to
him and spoke enthusiastically about a new era of Afro-American relationships. The
warm reception received signaled to the world America's commitment to helping the
new nation to transform from a colonial society into a modernized nation. The meeting
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of the two presidents brought hope in the development of the Volta River Project, yet
there were some difficulties to overcome. The State Department and the Treasury
thought the Kaiser company had been given preferential treatment, though they were
inspired by Gbedemah's careful negotiations with the World Bank and the United
States. Gbedemah feared the Soviets’ involvement in the project, yet he completed his
negotiations in Washington. While all things seemed to be going well, Nkrumah caused
another problem when he refused to accept the terms the World Bank laid down
following advice from Lord Kaldor. Nkrumah's action reignited intense criticism and
doubts. Here again, Ward took a firm stand and, in a famous memo, questioned: "Must
we have two Aswans?" The United States feared they might as well lose the Volta
scheme to the Soviets. Politically, the United States had hoped not to repeat another
Aswan incident and grant the Soviets control over Ghana. On the other hand,
Nkrumah's relations with Kennedy and the desire of both countries to achieve their aim
calmed waters, which allowed the development of the project to begin. The Americans
decided to use various means to connect with Nkrumah. Nkrumah continued
negotiations concerning the development of the project with Kennedy.63
Kennedy sent a letter to Nkrumah on June 29, 1961. He informed Nkrumah of
how pleased he was since it seemed all the obstacles had been addressed. He believed
the way have been cleared for the construction of the Volta scheme, which, when
completed, would signal to the other African countries America's desire to willingly
promote their national interest and modernize newly independent nations in Africa.64
Nkrumah received Kennedy's letter before departing with sixty delegates for two-month
tour of China, the Soviet Unions, and the Eastern bloc. During the tour, Nkrumah
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openly flattered leaders of the communist bloc. Nkrumah's comment about the
communists reignited more tension in Washington and created debates in Congress.
Senator Albert Gore, chair of the Senate Committee on Africa, believed Nkrumah's
policies favored the communist bloc. Kennedy questioned America’s intent to support
the Volta scheme with a considerable amount of money since Ghana was neither
proclaiming neutrality or liberalism. Congress remained unhappy with Nkrumah.65
Kennedy sent Franklin Williams, a delegate who later became an American ambassador
to Ghana, to study the situation in Ghana and provide a report. A group of three
delegates under the leadership of Senator Gore followed up in October 1961. While
Kennedy was ready to recognize Ghana's attempt to industrialize, circumstances in
Ghana made him question America's support for the project.66
Kaiser, Chad Calhoun, and Ward, who had the opportunity to meet Nkrumah
during Nkrumah's Eastern bloc tour, were optimistic the Volta project should continue.
In October 1961, Senator Gore visited Ghana and had the opportunity to interview
Nkrumah about the rumors concerning his movement towards the Eastern bloc. In
response to the rumors, Nkrumah asserted the western press had misinterpreted his visit
to the Eastern Bloc. He reported that his intent for the tour was to observe what the East
had achieved. Nkrumah's response did not convince Gore, who concluded that Western
colonialism continued to haunt the Ghanaian leader, and Soviet colonialism had blinded
him. After meeting with Nkrumah, Gore advised Kennedy that the United States should
put an end to supporting the project due to Nkrumah's pro-communist attitude and his
attacks toward the West. For Gore, the Volta River Project was not economically
beneficial for the United States and unlikely to benefit the VALCO group. Senator Gore
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believed funding the project would solely advance Ghana’s move to modernization
while the political and economic interests of the United States would not be achieved.67
The C.I.A. also issued a negative report about Nkrumah and the project. It
referenced Nkrumah's removal of moderate Ghanaian officials, the promotion of the
more radical-minded Adamafio, together with his imprisonment of his critics. The
report recommended that the United States pull out completely. The C.I.A. perceived
Nkrumah as an egoistic and selfish leader who wanted to use the Eastern bloc to achieve
his needs for industrializing while not committing entirely to communism. The C.I.A.
anticipated Nkrumah's ambivalent attitude would increase, and he would eventually
shift towards the communists. Moreover, the C.I.A. believed Nkrumah would also
interfere in the affairs of other African countries and encourage their support for the
Eastern Bloc continued suspicion of American and British motives. The C.I.A. believed
funding the project would empower Nkrumah's Ghana to compete with world powers
as an industrialized and modernized nation.68
Kennedy received a more astute and realistic report from Barbara Ward’s
husband, Sir Robert Gillman Allen Jackson, a United Nations administrator, and an
Australian naval officer who had specialized in logistic and technical assistance to the
developing world. Jackson believed that during Nkrumah's trip to the East, Boateng and
Adamafio had advised Nkrumah to eliminate all his expatriate colleagues such as Erica
Powell, General Alexander, and Jackson himself. Jackson also affirmed that
Adamafio's group limited access to Nkrumah, and no one with moderate leanings could
get in touch with him. Adamafio's group sought to achieve a socialist economy by
eliminating all forms of private enterprises.69 President Kennedy believed that
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canceling America's support for the Volta scheme would affect policy goals towards
Africa. In contrast, his support for Ghana would create a new opening for American aid
to non-aligned nations in Africa. Kennedy hoped American aid to modernize and
industrialize Ghana would ensure a more positive American presence in Ghana. At the
same time, Nkrumah's non-alignment and positive neutrality philosophy would prevent
him from leaning completely towards the Eastern bloc.70
After thoughtful deliberations, Kennedy decided to support the Volta River
Project. Although Congress and most officials did not want America to support the
project, Kennedy rejected their views. He declared support for the project as he intended
to assist Nkrumah in industrializing Ghana. Kennedy believed the final beneficiaries of
the project would be the people of Ghana and not Nkrumah's government, hence the
urgency to launch Ghana towards modernization. When the National Security Council
received news about Kennedy's decision, Kennedy declared, referring to his own
brother's reservations about the project: "The Attorney General has not yet spoken, but
I can feel the hot breath of his disapproval on the back of my neck." The opposition in
the United States never changed Kennedy's mind. On January 22, 1962, Edgar Kaiser
and Nkrumah signed an official agreement in Accra. Edgar Kaiser, the leader of the
private firm, represented the United States in signing the contract. In total, America was
to sponsor Ghana's modernization project with an amount of over $40 million.71
Nkrumah became the leader of the new Volta River Authority. He took full
responsibility for the project. He anticipated using the Volta scheme to transform the
new country through the United States and World Bank’s funds. The developers had
hoped the Akosombo Dam would be launched by July 1964. The various parties
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planned for electricity to start flowing in September 1965, the same period when the
loan repayments were also expected to start. The work began ahead of time on May 19,
1964. Nkrumah officially announced the ceremony, which brought down the steel and
concrete gates, closed the tunnel and began satiating the great Volta Lake. The lake was
to cover an estimated one-ninth of Ghana, of which the Volta River Project was part of
the social and economic benefits of the scheme. The plan was to provide maximum
benefit to the Ghanaian population and government. These outputs together would help
increase industrial activities through the production of electricity and would ensure
industrialization and modernization.72
The death of President Kennedy introduced a new setback for America's
support for the project. Kennedy, who had supported the idea of America financing the
project, was assassinated in Dallas on November 22, 1963. While Congress had not
supported financing the project, Kennedy's relations with Nkrumah had been influential
in shaping America's desire to launch Ghana towards modernization. According to
William Mahoney, the American ambassador to Accra, the death of Kennedy
diminished the eagerness of the American government to finance the Volta River
Project. The removal of administrative support created new problems as new avenues
were created for negotiations for the smelter. The great supporter of the project,
Kennedy, was no more. Nevertheless, Nkrumah was determined to modernize Ghana
and would do everything possible even if he had to shift towards the Soviets.73
The increasing intensity of Nkrumah's anti-American attitude presented another
hurdle towards America's support for the Volta scheme. Secretary of State Dean Rusk
had declared it was evident that Nkrumah and his government were behind the anti-
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American tension in Ghana. Rusk suggested America should review the aid towards
the program due to Nkrumah's attitude. After discussions with Rusk, William H.
Brubeck of the National Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs, reviewed the development of the Volta scheme with Assistant
Secretary of State Averell Harriman.74 During the conversation, Brubeck informed both
Harriman and Rusk that Edgar Kaiser was to dine with him that evening, February 6,
1964. Brubeck hoped then to discuss the project. Edgar Kaiser had become a close
friend of Nkrumah, state department officials believed Kaiser could act as a liaison to
connect the new administration with Nkrumah. The establishment of rapport with
Nkrumah would enhance the United States' presence in Africa. It would as well help
Nkrumah's ambition of promoting industrialization in Ghana through relations with
America.75
The increasingly anti-American atmosphere in Ghana had made some
Americans demand America's withdrawal from the Ghana project as a way of
retaliating. Most Americans believed America's support for the Volta project would
only benefit Ghana industrialization and modernization without promoting America's
economic and political interest. Richard L. Philips, chief State Department press officer,
incited the United States press to step up their roles against anti-American campaigns
from Ghanaians. No one could answer why other foreign powers were not vehemently
attacked, and the United States alone had to suffer in Accra. The American embassy
protested to the Ghanaian government over the Ghanaian press' abusive statement that
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Americans had killed people in Korea, Panama, Cuba, and Congo. Americans
demanded Congress use any means to punish Ghana.76
Politically, America's idea of pulling back would create a vacuum for
communist influence in Ghana, which the United States hoped to prevent by supporting
Nkrumah's desire to transform Ghana. The United States demanded that Nkrumah stop
the press and Ghanaian politicians’ attacks. Harriman warned that there was the
possibility of the United States government aborting the support for the project in either
March or April if the situation in Ghana does not change. The United States
recommended that the British prime minister should send a letter to warn Nkrumah
about the consequences of his attitude for the development of the project. At the same
time, Nkrumah was to ensure a cordial relationship with America based on the
agreement he had with President Kennedy. Even after the death of Kennedy, Nkrumah's
relations with Kennedy were used as a point of reference to strengthen GhanaianAmerican relations.77
Moreover, state officials had recommended that Edgar Kaiser, who had
established personal relations with Nkrumah, should immediately visit Nkrumah.
Kaiser was to emphasize the difficulties Nkrumah's words had presented to both the
United States government and Kaiser. Besides, Nkrumah had to send a letter to
Washington, indicating the favorable conditions in Ghana for the success of the project.
Nkrumah, who was determined to transform his country, wanted to use every available
means to gain America's full support in industrializing Ghana through the development
of the Volta scheme.78
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With the plan in possible jeopardy, Kaiser and Harriman visited Ghana to
review the entire project again with Nkrumah. Kaiser continued to support the
development of the project. However, some American critics asserted that the Kaiser
Cooperation had made an excellent bargain, one from which the American government
was not guaranteed a profit. Some Americans believed once the Ghanaian bauxite failed
to be used, the new smelter would be forced to depend on bauxite that the Kaiser's ships
imported. Some Americans believed that the Kaiser industry would benefit the most
from the high profit. However, Kaiser Corporation proclaimed its intent to assist
Nkrumah in modernizing Ghana. Although the Kaiser corporation had prioritized the
maximization of profit, Kaiser's cordial relations with Nkrumah, together with his
desire to support the newly independent nation in the transition towards
industrialization, continued to influence Edgar Kaiser’s desire to support the
development of the project. Nkrumah continued to search for capital investment as he
wanted Ghana to run the smelter using its bauxite. Nkrumah's success would position
Ghana in a better economic situation through Ghana's relations with the United States.
Nkrumah, Harriman, Kaiser, and Jackson had a long series of meetings, after which
they finally agreed that the smelter was to begin using Ghana's mined bauxite for its
operation. Although Ghana's bauxite was to be used, the development of the smelter
would be successful only with America's support through financing the development of
the project.79
In June 1964, Nkrumah and Kaiser officially launched the smelter project. The
two friends had maintained their relationships throughout the development of the
project with the hope of modernizing Ghana. On an opening day, Kaiser gave a speech
in which he emphasized hope, that a new colonial system would not be replaced with a
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new tyrannical system. Instead, Ghana would promote its freedom and project its
modernization through American support while maintaining neutrality.80
Despite the tense political situation in Ghana, the development of the smelter,
Tema harbor, and Akosombo Dam continued. By September 1965, the entire scheme
had been completed and the first electricity produced. President Nkrumah switched on
the electricity which flowed into the 500-mile grid linking Akosombo with Accra,
Kumasi, Takoradi, and the mining centers at both Tarkwa and Obuasi. The fact that
electricity was produced indicated the entire project was complete. Hence, the
development that took place after September 1965 was a preparation for the formal
opening of the completed project.81
The official opening took place on January 22, 1966, following the arrival of
President Nkrumah and his wife, Fathia Nkrumah. Earlier in the day, all movements
shifted towards southern Ghana as people traveled to Akosombo. Taxis, private cars,
cyclists, tro-tros (light buses), mammy lorries, coaches, and pedestrians held towards
'Electri-City' the name given to Akosombo on that day. Nana Kwafo Akoto, the
Omanhene of Akwamu, chaired the occasion as purification and libation took place as
people called upon the ancestral spirits to bless the completed project. Two young steers
were sacrificed to the gods along with an offering of libation with Ghanaian gin.82
Dr. Lodigiani, the director of Impregilo, was the first to speak at the event. He
commented on the cooperation between public and private firms, which he believed
created an opportunity for cooperation between private businesses and public
businesses in Africa. He applauded Ghanaian workers for their efforts towards the
creation of the project. Edgar Kaiser followed with his speech. Before delivering his
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speech, Kaiser opened a telegram that his father had addressed to Nkrumah. His father
expressed his regret for not making it for the occasion to partake in the great
accomplishment. Kaiser's theme centered on the quality of faith and personal relations
among statesmen and nations:
I am confident we are all aware that world conditions
economically and politically-demand increasing cooperation and
understanding among the world's nations. I believe deeply that
men of different nations-representing different viewpoints and
interests-can work together successfully. The requirement is a
bond of mutual trust-mutual, respect, and mutual self-interest in
accomplishing the specific task. These kinds of human bondage
are the priceless ingredients that bring a sense of understanding,
which we know can be achieved between peoples. Mr. Presidenttoday, you are dedicating still another steppingstone in the
direction of peace and understanding. And from steppingstones
such as these, a watching world can experience a resurgence of
faith. Faith never fails. It is a miracle worker. Our faith knows
because it sees what we cannot see. It sees resources, powers,
potencies, which our doubts and fears veil from us. Faith is
assured, is never afraid, because it sees the way outsees the
solution of its problem. It has dipped in the realms of our finer
life-our higher and diviner kingdom. All things are possible to
him who has faith-because faith sees-and recognizes the power
that means accomplishment. It looks beyond all boundaries-
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transcends all limitations, penetrates all obstacles, and sees the
goal.83
He told Ghanaians how grateful the Kaiser Corporation was to help in building a better
Ghana for both the current and future generations during his address to Ghanaians.84
Kaiser confirmed the completion of the project had ushered Ghana into a bright new
era with power that would grow and support a diversified economy. He continued that
Nkrumah's hope of achieving a better life for Ghana through industrialization had been
realized through the completion of the project.85
Nkrumah gave the main speech in the presence of Ghanaians, Americans,
Italians, and other individuals gathered, who had participated in the development of the
scheme. Nkrumah began by acknowledging the effort of all those who had played
distinctive roles in making the development of the project a success. Nkrumah affirmed
the goal of the project, which was to modernized Ghana, had been achieved through the
willingness of the United States government, the World Bank, and other private
institutions. He acknowledged the role of the Kaisers—father and son—who had
committed wholeheartedly towards supporting the project. He specifically cited the role
Edgar Kaiser played. Without his best friend, Edgar Kaiser, the Ghanaian leader
stressed, the project would not have been successful. He also acknowledged the
commitment of Calhoun, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. Nkrumah recalled an instance
with Eisenhower when the president said simply, "Then why don't you get on with the
damned thing?" Nkrumah also welcomed the Papal Nuncio and all other guests of the
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various nationals. He expressed a warm heart towards Kennedy and regretted Mrs.
Jacqueline Kennedy was not present at the occasion. Mrs. Kennedy had wanted to honor
the invitation to unveil the plaque in honor of the service both her husband, President
Kennedy, and Eisenhower played in the project. Nevertheless, she could not attend the
occasion, but wrote to Nkrumah and promised to visit Ghana shortly with her children.86
Nkrumah avoided his usual attacks on colonialism when he indicated a small
and dynamic country like Ghana sought only to establish absolute control over its
political, social, and economic institutions and envisaged transforming all forms of
colonial legacies. After Nkrumah had delivered his speech, he opened the powerhouse
plaque that signified the official inauguration of the Volta River Power Project. Per the
special request of the widow of President Kennedy, Madam Fathia Nkrumah unveiled
the second bronze plaque that signified the roles both Eisenhower and Kennedy played
towards the development of the Volta scheme. The place was filled with darkness, then
Nkrumah switched on the lights to showcase to attendees the amazing light. The event
continued with celebrations and fireworks throughout the night. With all these done,
the Volta River Project was completed.87
The Volta River Project on Ghana's Economy and Industries
On a limited level, the Volta River Project contributed to the Ghanaian
economy. In 1967, the first aluminum was exported, and later, aluminum began to
contribute about 5 to 6 percent of Ghana's exports. Nonetheless, there were no
significant changes in Ghana's export earnings. In total, the annual aluminum exports
between the years 1968-1973 amounted to 46 million cedis. Conversely, the cost of
imported alumina amounted to 23 million cedis. The total cost spent on imported
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cryolite, pitch, coke, and other chemicals that were needed for aluminum production
amounted to 9 million cedis per annum. Ghana's estimated maximum profit per annum
amounted to 14,196,000 cedis per year, of which Ghana ran at a loss when the amount
spent on imported machinery and other items were taken into consideration. The huge
amount spent as expenditure on the production of aluminum did not allow Ghana to
realize its profit expectation.88
While the project had been projected to reduce the unemployment rate, there
was limited changes in the unemployment rate. The rate of unemployment in Ghana in
the year 1970 stood the same as the rate in 1960; thus, 6 percent of the labor force was
unemployed. It must be emphasized that the rate in Ghana was not comparable to the
rate in many developed countries. Since the rate stood the same, it is unlikely the
development of the Volta River Project played the expected contributing role in the
employment situation in Ghana. A total of 2000 people were employed in the VALCO
smelter, a sector which was not intended to be for a labor-intensive. Seven thousand
(7000) people worked for the Volta River Project and Electricity Corporation of Ghana
(E.C.G.). Hence, the workers who were directly employed were small, with most of
them working on a casual basis.89
Due to the development of the Volta River Project, Ghana joined the aluminum
production countries though in an unsatisfactory manner. Ghana exported bauxite and
primary aluminum, while it imported alumina and rolled aluminum to be transformed
into aluminum products. The continuous transportation of heavy materials did not
benefit Ghana. The development of the project did not affect Ghana's trade-in useful
resources. About 250,000 and 300,000 tons of alumina were imported each year to
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satisfy the VALCO smelter. The Kaiser company produced the alumina from the
bauxite it mined in Jamaica.90
The Volta River Authority's dam produced the most significant amount of
electricity used in Ghana. The Electricity Company of Ghana (E.C.G.) supplied the
other half of the Ghanaian population with electricity through the production of
electricity from a diesel generating plant. The Volta River Authority sold some power
to the Electricity Company of Ghana each year and the company distributed electric
power to the Ghanaian public. The Volta River Authority also sold electricity to large
companies such as VALCO, Communaute Electrique du Benin, Akosombo Textiles
Limited, the Akosombo township, and other mining firms. Although the Volta River
Authority produced a considerable amount of electricity each year, electricity had been
a minor component in Ghana's energy supply. In 1969, the last year that had extensive
data on energy supplies available, a total of 2,700 million kWh electricity was generated
from both public and private sources. In the same year, a total of about 35,000 tons of
imported coal was consumed. About 615,000 cubic meters of imported petroleum
products were utilized as fuel. Since 1969, the electricity generated from the project
had shot up by 50 percent; hence oil and hydroelectricity can be said to be comparable
in necessity. Nonetheless, VALCO took a large percentage while the Ghanaian
population used a small proportion.91
What might have happened?
The development of the Volta project depended on both personal relations and
economic interest together with national ideology. In an instance when American
economic interest might have aborted the United States support for the Volta scheme,
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personal relations among statesmen ensured the Volta project kept running. Nkrumah
might have gained maximum support from the United States in the development of the
project and easily industrialize Ghana. However, Lee Harvey Oswald's assassination of
President Kennedy slowed down progress. Even when the Congo crisis had made the
development of the project questionable, Kennedy continued to discuss the
development of the project with Nkrumah. Moreover, despite the huge amount involved
in the project, together with criticism from Congress and state department officials,
Kennedy supported the new nation with the hope of industrializing Ghana while
America was to use the aid to attract other African countries. Unfortunately, the death
of Kennedy affected Nkrumah's ambition of industrializing Ghana within a space of
time. The new administration under the leadership of Jackson did not invest heavily in
the Volta scheme as Kennedy had done during his days. The new administration
perceived the project to be too expensive. Jackson had less interest in Africa and shifted
back and forth on American support for Ghana. While Edgar Kaiser had consistently
supported the project, his efforts alone could not easily influence Congress and state
officials.92
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the Volta River Project and how America
contributed towards its development. The project began from the initial works of Sir
Kitson, whom the British government appointed to study the existence of available
minerals in the Gold Coast aside from gold. Of all the parties that were involved, the
United States government and the Kaiser Corporation fully materialized their aims. The
United States government primarily desired to gain political influence in the newly
independent nation. At the same time, America also envisaged benefiting economically
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from the Volta River Project.93 The United States also envisaged contributing towards
modernizing the new nation. Relations among the leaders of the two countries shaped
the relationship between Ghana and America. The Kaiser Corporation also had a share
from the project and maximized its profits as a private company.94
Describing the project as a success when measured against the expectations of
Nkrumah, Kaiser, and Kennedy is a subject for debate. The project did not provide
Ghana with the healthy development that the Nkrumah government, President
Kennedy, and the people of Ghana expected. However, the project contributed
economically to the Ghanaian economy. Even if one defines the idea of development
by industrialization, the success of the project was open to questions. If we are to limit
ourselves merely to monetary gains, the success of the scheme is open to criticism.
Moreover, when one defines the development of the project in line with the political
autonomy of the new country, the project becomes awkward and too complicated for
description.95
If Nkrumah were alive today, he would have been extremely disappointed.
Today, the provision of electricity in Ghana remains unstable. Over the years, Ghana
experienced a continuous power shortage popularly known as dumsor. The irrigation
and lake transport part of the project seems not to provide the expected profit the
partners had anticipated.
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Into the World We Go, The Peace Corps Program as A
Facet of America-Ghana Relations.
"Certainly, I owe this gift to the boy Peace Corps Larry Grobel,
who helped me to discover an attribute that would later give me my
livelihood from 1982 after I had lost my job at the Ghana News
Agency as an editor. May God bless the boy wherever he may be
and all those who fostered the Peace Corps concept. Without their
vision, I would be selling chains in the streets in Accra."1
After Ghana had attained its independence in 1957, Nkrumah's most significant
domestic challenge became the transformation of the Ghanaian educational system. He
believed in restructuring education as a tool for modernizing his newly independent
country. Since Ghana spent many years under colonial rule, the country had a five
percent literacy rate in 1957 when Ghana attained its independence. The colonial
government had given little attention to the Ghanaian educational system.2 Upon
assuming power, Nkrumah developed a five-year plan which sought to ensure selfsufficiency in Ghana through universal education, a basic requirement for a modernized
nation.3 Ghanaian leaders sought to revise the educational system to remove incorrect
information spread under colonialism as they sought to achieve modernization.4
Nkrumah envisaged making elementary education free to allow all Ghanaians
to have access since mass education was seen as the primary tool for modernization.
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Built on the British system of education, Ghana's pre-tertiary system of education
consisted of primary and secondary school.5 Ironically, Nkrumah's program for selfsufficiency and independence required dependence on other postcolonial powers—
creating outside relationships, especially with the Americans, whom Nkrumah did not
particularly trust. However, the Ghanaian leader was willing to bend his ideals. The
United States' establishment of the Peace Corps program coincided with Ghana's need
for more teachers following Nkrumah's declaration of free universal primary education
in 1961.6
Nkrumah frequently expressed his reservations about American foreign policy,
especially in Africa, despite his hope that America could assist in Ghana's aim of
achieving modernization. Aware of the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) and how
it operated in fighting against some "Third World" leaders, Nkrumah became skeptical
because he suspected the Peace Corps volunteers were C.I.A. agents. 7 Suspicion was
mutual. Even in Washington, Nkrumah had been identified as a communist associate.
A New York Times editorial on July 16, 1961 published Senator Thomas Dodd's
statement characterizing Ghana as the "First Soviet Satellite in Africa."8 Despite
Nkrumah's suspicion about the Peace Corps program, he later accepted it, advising
Ghanaians to embrace the program, and requested volunteer teachers by the
commencement of the school term in September 1961. Nkrumah's desire to modernize
Ghana sustained his relations with America despite his skepticism about the United
States.9
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Along the line, the Peace Corps program and its volunteer teachers faced a rigid
teaching environment because of the structure of the Ghanaian "fidelity approach" in
implementing the curriculum, which was new to American teachers. Before
independence, Ghana stuck to the fidelity approach of curriculum implementation.
Modeled on the British Education System, this centralized curriculum gave teachers
minimal room for changes. Volunteer teachers were required to strictly comply with
how the government structured the syllabus. Volunteers had envisioned upgrading the
Ghanaian education system to make the syllabus match the needs and interests of both
learners and Ghanaian officials by restructuring the content and pedagogy. Since some
headmasters resisted innovations, tension between volunteers and headmasters
resulted.10
Despite challenges the program faced, the development of the project became
successful through personal relationships between Nkrumah and John F Kennedy rather
than relationships driven solely by ideology or necessarily economics. President
Kennedy was committed to supporting Ghana in modernizing its educational system
despite Congress' criticisms of Nkrumah's ideology as a communist. The American
ideal of helping all people to achieve a better life informed choice in Washington. On
the other hand, the Ghanaian culture of hospitality and the willingness to cooperate
while working to improve their social, political, and economic system made AmericanGhanaian relations smooth.
The United States Peace Corps program contributed immensely to modernizing
Ghana's education system despite the suspicion that surrounded America-Ghana
foreign policy. This chapter examines the contributions of the United States in
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developing the Ghanaian education system. The chapter will also discuss the challenges
the United States and its volunteers faced in their support towards transforming the
Ghanaian education system as a tool towards modernizing the new nation. It provides
an understanding of the contributions of the Peace Corps program and Cornell
University’s educational roles as a facet of United States-Ghana relations in building
up the newly independent nation through the development of Ghana's education.
Colonial System of Education in Ghana
Unlike other regions in Africa where missionaries established the first
European form of schools, sizable European trading companies established the first
Western form of schools that existed in Ghana. Before 1951, Ghana had achieved a
minimum level of internal self-government, but Britain controlled the educational
system of the country. Schools were not evenly distributed within the nation since the
educational system was at the minimum level, with about 3,000 schools catering for
about 312,000 pupils.11 Although educational activities expanded from the beginning
of the twentieth century, the general policies that guided educational development
remained static.12 From 1940, the educational sector experienced rapid growth. The
demand for primary education in the southern region of Ghana led to the establishment
of many primary schools in the South by the local communities, which lacked
government funding as well as equipment. Local communities established these
primary schools, most of which lacked equipment. Besides, these schools had untrained
teachers as staff.13 By 1945, the number of unaided schools had increased to 2,000 with
an enrollment of about 105,000 pupils outnumbering the government's assisted schools
and pupils in the government's assisted schools. The Educational Department's reports
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in 1951 and 1952 indicated the Colony and Ashanti areas had high numbers in terms of
the number of schools and pupils enrolled in the primary, middle, secondary, teacher
training, and technical schools compared to the Northern Territories.14
The colonial education curriculum in Ghana sought to satisfy the European
administrators who wanted to train personnel for their economic and administrative
gains. The colonial educational system was not structured to benefit Ghanaians. The
Colonial authority prioritized its interest against Ghanaian interests as it implemented
an educational system meant to indoctrinate Ghanaians against modernizing Ghana.
During the colonial days, formal education segregated boys and girls and minimized
the idea of universal education. Girls were family keepers and mainly focused on family
and home care related subjects, while boys were prepared to take up white collar jobs.
Also, the "fidelity form of curriculum," instituted during the colonial days hindered
educational innovations and modernization. Teachers were limited to the colonial
government curriculum without modification. Teaching and learning in Ghana did not
cater for the needs, interests, and aspirations of Ghana and Ghanaians. The colonial
authorities prohibited the teaching of content that supported Ghanaian interests,
nationalism, and modernization. 15
Educational System in the Days of Nkrumah
From 1951, the achievement of internal self-governance in Ghana led to the
emergence of a new African government in the British colony. The new government
increased the number of Ghanaians in the legislative and executive council. The new
government, under the leadership of Nkrumah, considered education as its greatest
domestic challenge.16 Nkrumah moved to upend the colonial system of education; he
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insisted that every individual must be entitled to an education that would jointly bring
holistic changes to the nation. Nkrumah envisioned Africanizing and removing colonial
practices and expanding the educational system to all regions to allow all Ghanaians of
school-going age to be enrolled.17
President Nkrumah admired the American educational system; he earned both
his bachelors and master’s degrees in that system. As a nationalist leader and an
individual interested in continental leadership and nationalist activities, he preferred the
American to the British system as an academic model. He believed the United States'
educational system developed people holistically to promote national interest. Nkrumah
felt the problem of subsistence could be made more manageable, and both the rich and
poor could have access to education. Moreover, the United States had rebelled against
Britain in the 1770s and established a quality educational system that he envisaged
Ghana could model. Moreover, great Africans, such as Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria,
who had arisen as great nationalists, had also gone through the American educational
system.18 Despite his reservations, the American system maintained a strong allure for
the Ghanaian leader.
Nkrumah's educational aim for Ghana began to manifest during his days at the
University of Pennsylvania in the 1930s. He believed every educational system should
be tailored to match the life of the people. This vision became his long-term educational
policy to shape the newly independent country between 1957-1966 as he sought to
modernize the new country.19 For Nkrumah, the Ghanaian education system should
mold Ghanaians and create the highest and most beneficial relationship with Ghanaian
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culture. He wanted to modernize the Ghanaian education system and provide universal
education to all Ghanaians by making education accessible and free for all school-going
children. The objective of making education accessible to all prompted Nkrumah to
implement the 1961 Act (Act 87) to ensure free universal primary education in Ghana.
He asserted that circumstances in Ghana had made the mere acquisition of knowledge
not valuable in contributing to Ghana's development. Instead, the application of the
knowledge to obtain practical and positive outputs for the benefit of the nation made
knowledge more valuable both for the individual and for the nation. Nkrumah exalted
the role of science as he prioritized the acquisition and application of knowledge for the
benefit of all. Nkrumah envisaged developing the educational system that would
nurture Ghanaians to impact society and their lives. Nkrumah believed the development
of university education was important not only in producing engineers, architects, town
planners, and builders, but it also played a pivotal role in contributing to the
development of Ghana. Nkrumah's ideal was one of empowering and developing
Ghanaians, and all Africans, with the needed skills and necessary information to
manage their affairs. Nkrumah believed education was the foundation for the creation
of Pan-Africanism.20
During the 1954 Legislative Assembly election campaign, Nkrumah promised
Ghanaians that he would expand educational opportunities and school facilities in
Ghana. Nkrumah envisioned change and development in Ghana. He believed that
education could be the primary means to achieve that goal.21 The education sector had
a role to play in making Ghana accomplish self-sufficiency despite the significant
challenges facing the educational system in the new country.22 Nkrumah desired an
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educational system that would produce scientifically literate people in Ghana, increase
productivity rate, and provide knowledge to enhance improvement in the Ghanaian
economy.23 In August 1951, the new government under Nkrumah implemented the
Accelerated Development Plan. The Accelerated Development Plan sought to ensure
rapid expansion of the public education system to provide education for all schoolgoing children in Ghana.24 Unlike the colonial system of education, the Accelerated
Development Plan made it possible for the government to sponsor all schools that won
its approval.25 On July 4, 1961, Nkrumah declared to Parliament that universal
education would be the sole means to ensure the development of the latent abilities and
intelligence of Ghanaians.26
The major challenge that hindered Nkrumah's vision proved to be the lack of
qualified teachers to execute the teaching project. The number of schools and pupils
that existed in the Ghanaian education system outnumbered the number of trained
teachers in Ghana. The Ministry of Education turned to the Peace Corps program,
together with the recruitment from overseas, to provide enough graduates to promote
the expansion of education. There remained grave doubts, however, about recruiting
foreigners to teach Ghanaian children.27
Overview of the Peace Corps Project
The Peace Corps Project began during John Fitzgerald Kennedy's campaign as
an American presidential candidate on October 14, 1960. He addressed a group of
10,000 students and asked how many Americans were willing to spend some years in
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developing countries to work for America as doctors, engineers, or technicians.28 This
speech inspired the students who took a step in organizing the "American Committed
to World Responsibility" drive and petitioned for the establishment of a program in
which students could assist people in developing countries.29
On January 21, 1961, Kennedy appointed Robert Sargent Shriver Jr, former
president of the Chicago Board of Education and his brother-in-law, as the head of the
task force. Shriver's initial task centered on studying the possibility of the Peace Corps
project.30 Upon studying the feasibility of a voluntary overseas project and making
positive recommendations, Kennedy issued an Executive Order #10924 on March 1,
1961, to establish the Peace Corps.31 The president appointed Shriver as the first
director three days after the executive order.32 Distinctively, the Peace Corps program
sought to provide a maximum trained workforce to contribute towards the
developmental needs of developing countries. The other programs the United States
had organized before the Peace Corps program provided military aid, capital assistance,
and technical assistance to other nations.33 The United States Congress defined three
essential goals of the Peace Corps program. First, the program would help the people
of interested countries and areas in meeting their needs for a trained workforce. Second,
the Peace Corps would provide a better understanding of Americans on the part of the
peoples served. Third, the Corps would promote a better understanding of other peoples
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on the part of Americans.34 Volunteers were to assist in raising the standards of living
and improving the educational systems of developing countries.35
Over the years, there has been a debate as to whether Kennedy had a moral
justification for the institutionalization of the Peace Corps or whether the program was
designed as a tool of American Cold War policy. Some scholars have described the
program as an ideological tool meant to preach about the American idea of democracy,
liberty, and equality to developing countries at the height of the Cold War. Kennedy
said during his inaugural speech that America intended to support people in misery,
those in the "Third World." Some scholars think the Peace Corps was an instrument for
supporting and spreading American interests and ideology during the Cold War, hence
America's intervention in the "Third World." Indeed, the program was to counter the
spread of Soviets communism by showing American friendship towards developing
countries. At the same time, the program assisted "Third World" countries in
developing their education and economic systems.36 Other people believe the Peace
Corps program sought to promote the Central Intelligence Agency’s vision of providing
tactical and strategic importance for America.37 These issues bothered Nkrumah.
Nonetheless, Nkrumah's continuous relations with Kennedy helped in developing trust
to ensure acceptance of the Peace Corps program. Nkrumah believed Kennedy
genuinely wanted to assist in transforming Africa. The Peace Corps program
contributed immensely to transforming the Ghanaian education system despite the
skepticism Ghanaian officials expressed.
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The Peace Corps in Ghana
Ghana became the first country to receive the first group of Peace Corps
volunteers. Before his appointment to run the agency, Shriver had toured Ghana and
other countries in Africa.38 Ghana's significance as the first Sub-Saharan African
country to gain its independence on March 6, 1957, made Shriver choose Ghana as the
first site for the Peace Corps program. Moreover, Nkrumah had been a popular figure
in the anti-colonial movement in Africa. Besides, Nkrumah, who had studied in the
United States and served as a teacher, prioritized the educational goals of the new
country. Nkrumah regarded the Peace Corps as a means to build the Ghanaian
educational system, which needed more teachers.39 Nkrumah believed universal
education served as the means to develop the ability and intelligence of Ghanaians as
he moved to transform Ghana into a developed, modern country. Kennedy and
Nkrumah's relations played a role in Shriver's choice. Kennedy envisaged supporting
the vision of his close friend, Nkrumah. Moreover, Nkrumah and Kennedy built trust,
and that made the corps program welcome in Ghana. Even if other "Third World"
leaders would reject the peace corps volunteers, Nkrumah, Kennedy's friend, would be
the testing tool and accept the peace corps volunteers into Ghana. These motivational
factors inspired Shriver in his choice of Ghana as the first beneficiary of the Peace
Corps initiative.40
On August 30, 1961, the first Peace Corps volunteers from America stepped
down from a plane in Accra. Ghanaians welcomed the Peace Corps volunteers.
Kennedy remained optimistic and believed Nkrumah would welcome the volunteers.
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The first fifty volunteers came attired in summer suits and light cotton dresses when
they first touch the land of Ghana.41 The Peace Corps volunteers began to sing the
Ghanaian new national anthem "Yen Ara Asaasa Ni" (This Is Our Homeland) in Twi.
The group studied Twi, the Akan dominant local language, before coming to Ghana.
The ability of the volunteers to sing in the local dialect of the Ghanaians signified to
the world and the Ghanaian population the friendship and understanding at the core of
the Peace Corps' mission to serve Ghana.42 Kenneth Baer presented a speech in Twi
after the volunteers finished singing. He indicated the Peace Corps volunteers had come
to both learn and teach. Tom Livingston from Woodale, Illinois, became the first
volunteer to take up a position as an English teacher at Dodowa Secondary School in
Ghana on September 12, 1961. Afterward, other volunteers began to work as teachers.43
Contributions of the Peace Corps Program Towards Ghana's Education
Before the arrival of the Peace Corps volunteers, Ghanaians believed the
volunteers would contribute to the development of Ghana's education as a step towards
modernization.44 Given Nkrumah's apparent skepticism of the corps, the very fact that
he did not deport the volunteers, suggests its success in Ghana in transforming the
newly independent nation. Kennedy's connection with Nkrumah allowed Ghana to
receive more volunteers over time.45 Moreover, the fact that the United States later
expanded the Peace Corps program in Africa and invested more money suggests that
the results of the program satisfied the United States.46
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Education has always been the Peace Corps' major contribution to modernizing
Ghana. Although Nkrumah understood universal education as the mark of a modernized
nation, he recognized such a vision could materialize only through support from a
superpower like the United States. Nkrumah built a strong relationship with Kennedy
as a measure to attain Ghana's educational needs. The Peace Corps contributed to
Nkrumah's ambition of ensuring free education for all desiring Ghanaians up to the
secondary level. The program saved the Ghanaian Ministry of Education from huge
expenditures. The Ghanaian government would have spent huge sums on teachers'
salaries, development costs, and indirect expenses. An examination of the number of
volunteer teachers by 1966 brings to light the amount the country saved. Ghana was
relieved of the amount spent on training teachers, paying teachers' salaries, and
developing institutions. Moreover, the Peace Corps program mitigated against the
indirect costs that would have drained a considerable percentage of Ghana's budget.
Training one teacher for five years costs about $15,000. With the first batch of volunteer
teachers sent in 1961, the Ministry of Education was relieved of the stress of training
and employing more Ghanaian teachers. The ministry's need for more teachers would
have burdened the country's limited resources. Moreover, there were a limited number
of trained teachers in Ghana to enhance the expansion of the Ghanaian education
system. Kennedy planned to help Nkrumah materialized. American support through the
provision of teachers released Ghana from financial burden. At the same time, the
available resources were channeled towards various other sectors in the transformation
of the country.47
The expansion of the educational system in Ghana became successful through
the Peace Corps. Kennedy contributed towards the expansion of the Ghanaian
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educational system as Nkrumah, his friend had envisioned. Without the corps, only the
major cities would have enjoyed universal education. The rural regions would have
continued to suffer. While Ghanaian teachers had avoided posting to the "bush" schools
since the rural areas lacked amenities, the volunteer teachers welcomed working in the
rural centers and newly established schools. Volunteer teachers preferred teaching in
rural and newly established schools compared to the urban centers. The volunteers felt
the rural schools and newly established schools needed their service. Through support
from American volunteers, each region of Ghana tasted an expansion of the free
education system. Teachers handled classes in both the rural and urban centers. Also,
the introduction of the Peace Corps program increased the number of graduates from
the teacher training colleges. Volunteer teachers occupied positions in teacher training
colleges, which allowed for an increase in the teacher training college enrollment. With
enrollment increased, the graduation rate also increased over the years. These graduates
contributed towards the national interests and goal of modernization.48
Peace Corps volunteers served as math and science teachers in the various
institutions in Ghana: universities, teacher education programs, and secondary schools.
In the secondary schools, the success of Ghanaian science teaching depended on the
Peace Corps volunteer teachers. Over the years, the Ghanaian Ministry of Education
assigned teachers to teach in the various secondary schools and teacher training
colleges. Some also taught in Ghana's three major universities in the biological and
physical sciences.49 The Peace Corps program became the means to produce whitecollar workers. Ghanaians who achieved white-collar status between 1961-66
invariably had, at one point in time, encountered a Peace Corps teacher.50 Former
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students of the Peace Corps program testified to the impact they received from the
volunteer teachers. For example, Ansah Barnor, a former student of the Peace Corps
program, appreciated how the program shaped his professional life. Barnor believed the
program moved him from a life on the streets to the middle class. He believed the
program placed him in a white-collar job. In the absence of the Peace Corps, the
unemployment rate in Ghana would have increased vehemently. Ghanaian American
relations provided Ghanaians with the prerequisites needed to function in various
workplaces. Kennedy, Nkrumah's close friend, contributed to assist the expansion of
the Ghanaian education through instituting the Peace Corps program.51
The Peace Corps program also played a role in increasing enrollment in schools
and raised the number of new schools between 1960 and 1965. Primary school
enrollment rose from 444,117 to 1,137,495. Moreover, secondary schools had increased
from 59 to 105 between 1960 to 1965, with enrollment jumping from 16,577 to
42,111.52 In 1957, Ghana's enrollment stood at 571,580 pupils in both primary and
middle schools. By 1963-64, the number increased to over 1.3 million. There were 38
secondary schools with 9,860 pupils in 1957, and this figure shot to 89 schools with an
enrollment of 32,000 in 1963-64. Teacher-training institutions also increased more than
four times from 1957 to 1963-64.53 Peace Corps volunteers contributed immensely
towards this expansion. Volunteers taught at various educational levels. The
coordination between the two countries played a significant role in making the program
successful, hence the increment in enrollment. Moreover, the relations between
President Kennedy and Nkrumah shaped the program amidst some challenges.
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Eighty-five percent of the volunteers taught in the Ghanaian educational cycle
and prepared students for the General Certificate of Examination Level. Most of the
teachers taught chemistry, physics, zoology, and general science to prepare students for
their final exams.54 For instance, Lee Carlson, as a volunteer, taught engineering at the
Accra technical institute. Also, Donald Graff, a network volunteer, taught physics and
chemistry to prepare students for their final examination.55 American relations with
Ghana contributed to the development of science education in the new country. Every
part of Ghana felt the volunteers' impact, which brought a significant transformation.
Regions that had been behind in terms of educational development felt the presence of
the volunteers.
Most of the volunteers also engaged in secondary activities such as organizing
drama and clubs, building athletic teams, organizing sporting activities, serving as role
models to Ghanaians, and providing an enthusiastic spirit for Ghanaians.56 Volunteer
teachers engaged in institutional development in some rural and newly established
schools. They assisted headmasters to construct science labs and libraries and provided
materials.57 These volunteers contributed to increasing Ghanaian citizens' level of
numeracy and creativity. Peace Corps volunteers served in other capacities besides
education, with twenty-five (25) volunteer geologists sent to help in the development
of Ghana's mineral reserves.58
The Peace Corps program also contributed towards restructuring the Ghanaian
system of education by introducing new math and learning styles that emphasized
reasoning and problem solving over rote learning. Some of the volunteers created an

Amin, “The Perils of Missionary Diplomacy,” 42.
Amin, “The Perils of Missionary Diplomacy,” 43.
56
Boyle, Blohm, and Helfer, Peace Corps/Ghana Country Program Evaluation, 28.
57
Boyle, Blohm, and Helfer, Peace Corps/Ghana Country Program Evaluation, 29.
58
William Mahoney, “Peace Corps” Saturday Evening Post (February 12, 1966): 4.
54
55

73

enhanced mathematics syllabus to improve the teaching of mathematics in Ghanaian
schools.59 With the growth of the Peace Corps project, community development
became the other agenda aside from teaching. Volunteers contributed to the building
of community libraries, sports centers, water projects, and others.60
The Ghanaian National Service Scheme in Ghana emerged from the Peace
Corps project. Some years after the introduction of the Peace Corps, Ghana began a
mandatory version of youth service meant to address the educational, technological,
and agricultural needs of the nation modeled on the Peace Corps program. The fact
that Ghanaians sought to replicate the Peace Corps in their national volunteer
organization presents a strong affirmation of the American endeavor.61 However, the
Peace Corps’ story had its challenges that the program encountered overtime.
Peace Corps Challenges
Even before the commencement of the Peace Corps Program, challenges had
begun unfolding in the United States. The civil rights movement hit its peak in the
1960s and America's racism and foreign policy overshadowed volunteer training from
the start.
In Africa, the Peace Corps program's reputation became controversial due to
the scandalous behavior of Margery Michelmore Heffron in Nigeria.62 Heffron, having
graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Smith College, joined the first
batch of the Peace Corps program. Although she did not resemble an individual who
could set off an international incident, she created a scene on October 14, 1961, that
threatened the success of the Peace Corps program in Africa. During her training at the
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University of Ibadan, Nigeria, Michelmore sent a postcard to her boyfriend that derided
Nigeria's "Squalor and primitive living conditions." Before the postcard was mailed, a
Nigerian student who was offended by the description of the country got hold of the
letter and distributed copies to all over the campus. This led to mass riots, and
Nigerians, who perceived their country to be better than "primitive" as described in the
content of the letter, gathered to torment Michelmore. The press picked up the issue
and published it on the front page of the newspapers. The tension that arose forced
Michelmore to flee Nigeria to Washington, D.C.63 The uproar over Michelmore reached
Ghana in short order. Peace Corp volunteers worried it would upend the carefully laid
plans of both Americans and Ghanaians. Volunteers believed the Peace Corps program
would close as Nigerians would sack volunteers. Ghanaians would follow suit by
throwing out the Peace Corps officials.64 Instead of apologizing to Nigeria, United
States officials justified the racist comments of Michelmore. Moreover, one would have
expected Kennedy to apologize to Africans for the racist comments. Rather, President
Kennedy sent a personal letter expressing his deepest sympathy to the "poor girl;" the
president, in turn, faced American anti-racists demonstrations for defending
perpetrators of racism.65
While the volunteers envisaged a transformation of the Ghanaian education
system through their service, they were not necessarily up to the challenge. Most of the
Peace Corps volunteers were not qualified to teach. In its official request of American
teachers, the Ghanaian Ministry of Education asked that only those personnel with a
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master's degree from an American institution could qualify as teachers for Ghanaian
secondary schools. The Ministry of Education considered the American master's degree
to be equivalent to the British bachelor's degree. However, the massive demand for
teachers to match the increased enrollment in education facilities eliminated the
qualification demand.66 Out of the numerous volunteers, most were not educators nor
specialists who had majored in the area of specialization they were assigned to teach.
Only sixteen volunteers out of the entire group dispatched to Ghana in 1961 had
teaching experience.67 The experienced teachers were sent to first-class secondary
schools since the government of Ghana wanted to maintain a higher standard for the
best students in the bid to modernize the new country.68 For most of the volunteer
teachers, their first year of teaching in the various schools was trial-and-error
experiences. Nonetheless, since the standard of the Ghanaian secondary school system
was below that of the United States, the volunteers were better qualified than the local
teachers despite not being education majors.69 Still, volunteer teachers who taught
courses in which they had little training during college became vulnerable. Many also
performed numerous teaching and co-curricular activities that made it difficult for them
to adequately prepare for class. For instance, Peace Corps volunteer Howard Ballwanz,
taught English, history, geography, and religion at Swedru Secondary School while
doubling as the dormitory supervisor.70
The Ghanaian political environment also created a fierce challenge for Peace
Corps volunteers. The Peace Corps suffered from editorial comments from Ghanaian
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newspapers, which often described the program as a new form of imperialism.71
Nkrumah also began to chastise the volunteers. He had initially called for the service
of the Peace Corps volunteers with the hope of restructuring the Ghanaian education
system. Nevertheless, Nkrumah posed perhaps the greatest challenge to the program
from 1963. His skepticism about the Peace Corps program never fully subsided. The
demise of Kennedy, Nkrumah's close friend, might have altered Nkrumah's perception
of the Peace Corps program. After an attempted coup to overthrown Nkrumah failed
on January 22, 1964, he began to implement steps to counter the volunteers' influence.
He believed the C.I.A. and the Peace Corps volunteers had joined to mastermind the
attempted coup d' état. Nkrumah banned Peace Corps volunteers from the teaching of
English and history because he believed the volunteers would use such courses to
indoctrinate students against his government.72 According to George Ayi-Bonte, the
Associate Director of the Peace Corps program in Ghana, American volunteers had
used George Orwell's Animal Farm in their English classes to shed light on the
Ghanaian system of government. Nkrumah became furious, for he believed students
might later rebel against his government. This Orwellian restriction never extended to
Canadian and Soviets volunteers. 73
In 1963, Nkrumah went a step further to invite some young volunteers from
Russia. Furthermore, Nkrumah allowed other Western volunteers into Ghana, and that
brought competition between American volunteers and European volunteers.
Nkrumah might have lost trust in solely depending on America's support to transform
Ghana. One American volunteer reported Nkrumah wanted to neutralize the Peace
Corps teachers. On the other hand, he wanted to limit the influence of the American
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teachers as well despite believing the United States had much to contribute towards
Ghana's modernization. Nkrumah's invitation to the Russians created tension and
competition between the two blocs. Both Americans and Russians were striving for
influence in Ghana.74 On the part of Nkrumah, he saw nothing wrong with the
invitation of Russian teachers since he desired to use every possible means to
modernize the newly independent country through support from the superpowers.
Cornell-Ghana Project: Facet of Ghana-U.S. Relations in Education
Beyond state-to-state ties such as those between the Ghanaian government and
the U.S. Peace Corps, other private organizations from the United States also
contributed towards the development of the Ghanaian education system. The creation
of home economics and agriculture studies as part of the Ghanaian school curriculum
can be attributed to Ghana's relations in the early 1960s with USAID and with the U.S.
land grant college system. These interactions between Ghana and the United States
ushered in Cornell University's contributions to restructuring the education system as a
mark of launching Ghana towards modernization.75
From 1961, Cornell university assisted in building the Ghanaian education
system through the development of the Cornell-Ghana Project at Winneba Teacher
Training College. In 1961, Ghana's Ministry of Education officially requested
assistance from Cornell's Home Economics faculty in developing a post-secondary
level curriculum for teachers. The project brought many Cornell faculty to Ghana to
conduct an assessment for planning and staffing between 1962-1967. The Winneba
Teacher Training College became the site for the project.76
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The Cornell-Winneba Project envisioned developing a 4-year home economics
curriculum at the college level at Winneba Training College. The project also aimed to
establish a Home Economics Department at the University of Ghana, Legon. The
curriculum had the Ghanaian family unit as its central focus—the project trained
teachers as leaders who could guide family members in raising their standard of
living.77 Understanding the family system in Ghana would serve as a medium for
women to adjust to Ghanaian society, which had experienced dramatic changes and was
undergoing rapid agricultural and industrial expansion. The project, the combined work
of the Winneba Training College, the New York State College of Home Economics,
the University of Ghana, and the Ghanaian Ministry of Education materialized due to
the interaction between the United States and Ghana. Financing the Cornell program
became the major problem the project had to face at the initial stage. Although the
United States made contributions to support the program, the amount provided was
below the figure needed to facilitate the operation of the project. Funds from Cornell
University, together with contributions from the Ghanaian government, made the
program successful.78
In 1962, a plan for the project was drafted in Ghana and refined at Cornell.
Cornell faculty visited Ghana to help set the project in motion. Professor Kathleen
Rhodes and Harold Feldman made a short visit to Ghana. Rhodes had the quality to
contribute towards expanding the Ghanaian education system. Born in Britain and
having earned her doctoral degree at Cornell, she bore a clear understanding of both
British and American education systems. Feldman from Cornell's Department of Child
Family Studies led the development of contemporary studies of family practices. Based
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on an earlier visit to Ghana in 1963, Feldman became convinced the country needed
research centers at various places. He set out to construct the centers.79 The Peace Corps
program made a significant impact. Most of the students developed an appreciation for
the practicality of the skills they were learning in the classroom. Many of the students
who enrolled in the home economics course had previous experience as teachers in the
lower forms. Therefore, they were able to spread what they learned. In 1963, Feldman
recommended that subjects in social sciences theory, marriage, and family be added to
the Ghanaian curriculum. With these needed skills, students could contribute to the
development of the new nation.80
Through the United States financial support, together with constant contact with
various organizations in the United States, Ghanaians began to realize that the concepts
of post-secondary education could be broadened to include more public service,
extension education, and applied research.81 At the center of the new teacher training
curriculum for home science at Winneba laid a deeper understanding of the Ghanaian
family system. The introduction of a home science course foresaw training teachers
who, through research and demonstration, would bring to their nation new practices in
home management and children's development. Cornell University embraced the task
of training teachers and preparing the research center for such a goal.82 Cornell
University supported the transformation of the Ghanaian education system through the
inclusion of home economics and agriculture studies as courses that prepared the
Ghanaians mindset about the family system and planning together with agricultural
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practices. The development of home management and rural life, which are tools for a
modernized nation, materialized through the support of the United States university in
launching Ghana towards modernization.
The Status-Quo of Ghana's Education at the End of Nkrumah's Reign
By 1966 when the coup d' état overthrew Nkrumah, major transformations had
taken place in the Ghanaian Public educational system through the United States'
support. Many schools were built while the government had formerly absorbed most
private schools. Compared to 1951, when the Educational Report recorded lesser than
1,700 schools with about 226,000 pupils, the number increased to about 11,000 schools
and 1.5 million pupils by 1966.83 The enrollment and number of schools figures in
1951 when Nkrumah took over increased substantially, with each educational level
experiencing expansion. Between 1965-1966, university enrollment increased 20 times,
while secondary school enrollment saw growth of 14 times the figures recorded in 1951.
Primary and middle schools recorded seven- and four-times enrollment increments,
respectively.84
Moreover, education had become tuition-free in all public education system,
and the government provided free textbooks for all children schooled in the primary,
middle, and secondary schools.85 Untrained teachers consisted of 65 percent of the total
teachers at the elementary level by 1965, while expatriate and Peace Corps volunteers
heavily dominated secondary schools in Ghana. University education as well expanded
though partly due to the failure of the secondary schools to transform qualified
graduates in science into the needed workforce for the country.86
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Ghana paid a heavy price for its educational success since the central
government took the sole responsibility of sponsoring education and implementing
policies to make the educational system work. By 1965, a total of 67 million cedis,
which was 14 times that of 1951, was invested in the educational sector. The United
States' support towards the launching of Ghana toward modernization contributed
massively towards the expansion of the Ghanaian educational facilities, school
enrollment, and the provision of teachers. The American Peace Corps program, together
with the pivotal roles of Cornell University, transformed the Ghanaian education to the
road of quality education by 1966.87
Educational Enrollment (1951 and 1965-1966)
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1,000,000
500,000
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4,956

15,144

4,267

1965-1966

The figure above represents the transition in enrollment status from 1951 to 1965-66.
figure 1: Source: (Washington: U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Office of Education, 1976),51.
Conclusion
The Peace Corps' successes and challenges, together with the roles of Cornell
University (U.S.A.), were examined in this chapter. The Peace Corps achieved its first
stated goal: to serve the need of other countries. While it had not changed the entire
globe by 1966, Ghana benefited immensely from the United States' contributions. The
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1,471,407

United States support for Ghana ensured the success of the free education policy,
increased enrollment, expanded the Ghanaian education system, increased the number
of teacher training graduates, and increased the number of educational and noneducational facilities. Moreover, through the efforts of Cornell University, Ghanaians
were introduced to Home Economics as a course of study which restructured Ghanaians
view about family structure and planning.
Nonetheless, the instituted program faced significant setbacks due to the rigid
nature of the Ghanaian education system, the political environment in Ghana,
volunteers' lack of teaching experience, and a low standard of living. Volunteers'
commitment to contribute towards Ghana's educational system helped in transforming
Ghana despite the series of challenges the United States-Ghanaian relations
encountered.88 Ghana expanded and diversified the Peace Corps program to include
other non-educational sectors to ensure economic and social developments in Ghana.89
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Ghanaian Trade Relations with The United States
Ghana and the United States of America have maintained very peaceful trade
relations over the years. The United States is the largest importer of Ghana
cocoa. We, for our past, have, for a long time, obtained from the United States
our principal imports of machinery, transport, equipment, fuel, and chemicals.
These trade relations with the United States are significant to the U.S. I am sure
that this exhibition will lead to the opening of further sources of trade and
commerce between the two nations.1
-President Kwame Nkrumah, November 27, 1961, at the opening of
the U.S. Trade Fair in Accra.
Ghana's trade relations with the outside world date from the pre-colonial era
when the colony was under British hegemony. In pre-colonial times, Ghanaians traded
in various goods with North Africa through the Sahara Desert. They also traded with
their immediate neighbors. Moreover, Ghanaians had been heavily involved in the
trans-Atlantic slave trade from its beginnings in the sixteenth century to the nineteenth
century. Ghanaians traded in several commodities, including gold, salt, ivory, slaves,
and kola nuts. They transported large quantities of gold from their shores to England,
Holland, America, France, Portugal, and later imported other products during the
colonial days. Ashanti, a region rich in kola trees, emerged as a robust commercial
power due to the massive demand for kola nuts.2
Nkrumah's emergence as the president of Ghana was a turning point in Ghana's
relation with the outside world, particularly the United States. Nkrumah hoped to
industrialize the new country, and this required new initiatives since Ghana had low
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foreign investments and local capital. The new Ghanaian government worked at
transforming the newly independent nation into a thriving center for industrial and
agricultural activities. The government established business relations with both the free
world and Sino-Soviet bloc countries as it worked to achieve its economic vision. Also,
the new government's strategy in transforming the Ghanaian economy and trade
relations had been to welcome foreign investors. Nkrumah hoped to maintain Ghanaian
sovereignty while gaining support from both the East and West. In fact, Nkrumah
swung back and forth between the West and East. He later became interested in
establishing trade relations with the United States with the hope of using GhanaAmerica trade relations to transform Ghana. Ghana depended heavily on the United
States for most of its imports. Key American capitalists identified Ghana as a fertile
region for business.3
Nkrumah admired the United States' stated ideology of allowing newly
independent states to manage their own affairs. Such an approach aligned with
Nkrumah's positive neutrality and non-alignment philosophy. The United States
allowed citizens of developing countries to work on their own while Americans
provided guidance. Nkrumah hoped Americans would offer guidance to Ghanaians as
the former allows the latter to work on their own.4 He believed his vision of
modernizing Ghana through trade in products and other trade relations could
materialize primarily through the support of the United States.5
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Hitherto, the Ghanaian economy depended on agriculture, which employed
more than half of the population and contributed towards small industries. Ghana's total
dependence on agriculture contributed to the collapse of the economy and trade,
following the fall in prices of cocoa and other agriculture products. 6
Ghana had access to the American market and increased her exports by millions
of dollars per annum through trade with the United States. Both Americans and
Europeans viewed Ghana's entry to the open market as a milestone towards becoming
a modernized country. Ghanaians worked at increasing production as their exports to
the outside world increased through contact with America. Ghana prepared to
modernize by partnering with a more prosperous country. Ghana's strong dependence
on America, however, contributed to the fall in the Ghanaian trading system since
America later lost hope in the economy and decided not to invest much in Ghana from
the 1960s.
Trade created growth, and growth increased income, Nkrumah believed. Ghana
would export cocoa, gold, timber, and diamond to the United States whiles America
would, in return, export capital goods, consumer goods, and intermediate goods to
Ghana. The growth of income through an increase in exports would assist the nation's
transformation to modernization. The increment in exportation would help Ghana's
economic growth and position the country to modernize. As various American firms
traded with Ghana, trading activities increased, and the growth in trade helped in the
modernization of Ghana's market system. Both small and large businesses grew, and
the growth of businesses created economic opportunities for Ghanaians and prepared
the country for modernization and a prosperous future.7
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Though America sought to assist Ghana in its bid of modernization through
trade, the United States also wanted to promote its own economic and political interests.
Despite Nkrumah's tough attitude of not easily giving in to American trade policies and
requests, the United States' trade relations with Ghana contributed massively towards
the modernization of Ghana. In October 1959, the American embassy in Accra reported,
"Our trade relations with Ghana, including access to raw materials produced in Ghana,
are good. Our political relations with Ghana are friendly and fruitful."8 Unfortunately,
the economy built through trade relations with the United States did not survive for
many years. From the 1960s, there arose adverse changes in the economy which
included the fall in cocoa prices and America's unwillingness to invest heavily in
Ghana. The economic changes caused the Ghanaian economy to fall apart. The heavy
debt Ghana incurred due to Nkrumah's investment in other African nations negatively
affected Ghana's economy.9
This chapter examines the Ghana-America trade relations by focusing on trade
in products between the two nations and the American Trade Fair of 1961. The chapter
discusses the United States Trade Fair in Ghana, an economic activity that strengthened
trade in Ghana, and between the two nations. The study reveals the contributions
America made towards Ghana in the field of businesses as a facet in transforming the
newly independent country. Also, the study discusses the economic problems which
Ghana faced from the 1960s following an increment in Ghana's debt and the fall in
cocoa products.
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Ghana's Foreign Trade Relations under Nkrumah's Regime
Ghana had all the necessary commodities for economic and international trade
success by 1957 when it attained independence. The country had become the producer
of about two-fifths of the world's cocoa, a status that she maintained for years. Ghana's
position in the global production of cocoa made her the country with the highest per
capita income in tropical Africa for about a decade before 1957. It chiefly depended on
cocoa production to sustain its economy; hence the fall in cocoa prices from the 1960s
negatively affected the Ghanaian economy. Ghana became self-sufficient in food and
exported surplus due to its stable population of about 7 million and its vast fertile lands.
The country also became abundant in tropical timber and a variety of minerals,
including gold, diamond, bauxite, and manganese. For instance, the Ashanti
Corporation's Gold Mine, located in Ghana, had become the richest Gold Mine
corporation in the world by 1957.10
Nkrumah indicated that it was only after independence when Ghanaians began
to fully control trading activities and had the power to negotiate, hence, he believed
Ghanaians could not be blamed for the low trade output during the colonial era. His
government aimed to diversify the Ghanaian economy beyond the reliance on cocoa to
include the production and exportation of palm kernel, spices, coffee, rubber, and
tobacco. Nkrumah foresaw the need to diversify since total dependence on a single
product would collapse the economy once prices fall. Nkrumah announced that
agricultural products, when produced, would be used to increase production in
Ghanaian industries as the country worked to industrialize and modernize. Moreover,
he explained to Ghanaians that the production of goods would increase the exportation
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to foreign countries like the United States. He further promoted Ghana's ability to
export some agricultural products that have never been exported.11
Ghana's importation of consumer goods also increased during Nkrumah's
regime from $106 million in 1958 to $150 million in 1960. Producer products increased
from $58 to $118 million, with the total imports reaching about $400 million. 12 These
figures contradicted Nkrumah's ideology of non-alignment and positive neutrality.
Nkrumah believed that political independence meant economic independence.
Therefore, Nkrumah envisaged developing the doctrine of non-alignment in his trade
relations, even as he grew closer to the West.13 At independence, Ghana's economy had
proven to be better than any black African country, and Ghana's economy grew steadily
over time. American investment in Ghana grew faster until the 1960s when America
began to stop investing in Ghana due to the fall in the Ghanaian economy.14
Nkrumah's government adopted policies geared towards bringing in foreign
private capital, and that strategy generated competition between foreign investors and
domestic investors. New businesses that the Nkrumah government established had to
compete with already existing banking, insurance, shipping, timber, construction, and
manufacturing firms. Nkrumah's administration granted preferential treatment to
government-owned industries. Nevertheless, Nkrumah did not impose restrictions on
the operations of foreign investors. The freedom he granted to foreign companies
allowed international firms to continue to dominate the industrial sector. The

11

Kwame Nkrumah Africa Must Unite. (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1963), 109-110.
Steel F. William, Import Substitution and Excess Capacity in Ghana, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 1972), 6, cited in Anasenchor "Ghana’s Trade Relations with the United States of America: A
Case Study of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)," 43.
13
William, "The Ghana Economy," 476.
14
Johnson, “U.S. Trade Fair in Ghana: America holds First Exhibition in West Africa,” 28-9.
12

89

government only nationalized the sales of timber and the private transactions of cocoa,
Ghana's primary export product.15
Nkrumah, being desperate to modernize Ghana through trade, decided to open
up to the Soviets and the United States concurrently. When Clarence Randall, formerly
of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, learned of Nkrumah’s action, he
questioned Nkrumah’s new trade partnership with the Soviets and he argued that
Nkrumah did not understand the implications of Ghana’s trading relationship with the
Soviets. Nkrumah replied in a press release citing his discussions with Khrushchev and
asserting he was not ready to compromise Ghana’s neutrality with any country.
Nkrumah announced he would demonstrate Ghana’s neutrality if the West would give
him a chance.16
Nkrumah's Major Challenges
Ghana's economic relations and trade operations faced three major setbacks
after independence. Ghana suffered due to lack of skilled workforce meant to replace
foreign investors with local enterprises. Nkrumah wanted to ensure Ghanaians would
take over trade operations. Nonetheless, this project came to naught due to the lack of
competent personnel in Ghana.17 Secondly, the country faced a challenge from the
limited capacity of Ghanaian private and public firms to create industrial investments.
Direct investment from foreign private enterprises became the sole external source for
industrial capital in Ghana between 1957-1960. Nkrumah and his advisers hoped
dependence on foreign investors would reduce overtime. Meanwhile, they depended on
foreign investors to build a new economy. Nkrumah believed that restricting foreign
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investors would make it difficult for the Ghanaian system to attract foreign companies.
By the 1960s, Ghana continued to depend on foreign investors and the Ghanaian
economy collapsed when foreign investors began to lose interest in investing heavily
in Ghana.18
Thirdly, Nkrumah's administration also suffered from the division between
Nkrumah's ideology and that of the majority party. Nkrumah and the majority party
debated over whether corporate or private firms should be the main benefactors in the
new nation. Nkrumah preferred a socialist state as he envisaged state control over the
economic sector of the new country. Besides, he feared the rise of an efficient capitalist
industry would hamper his political agenda. Nkrumah once told a Cabinet Minister,
Kojo Botsio, that if any Ghanaian possessed a significant amount of money, the person
would have much influence. Nkrumah believed influential Ghanaians would be
dangerous to his political career. Nkrumah thought that foreign investors who had no
background in Ghana posed no threat to him since such people could not gain political
influence. Perhaps, if Ghana had built a capitalist economy, private firms would have
saved the country from the disastrous economy it faced from the 1960s.19
Potential Trade relations between Ghana-America
Nkrumah visited the United States in 1958 for trade discussions aimed at
winning America's support to help build the Ghanaian trade system. He toured New
York for the first time since his time as a student in America 23 years before. Nkrumah
delivered a speech regarding Ghana's economic prospects to business groups and
various organizations. He emphasized that Ghana's relations with America would
contribute to the diversification of the Ghanaian economy from dependence on the
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cocoa beans. Nkrumah’s goal of diversifying the Ghanaian economy did not happen.
During his speech, Nkrumah informed the National Foreign Trade Council about
Ghana's willingness to establish an investment agreement with America to protect its
investors. He went ahead and discussed Ghana’s commerce, and his intention to partner
with the United States for trade in products and industrialization. Nkrumah jokingly
told Americans, “You are not drinking enough cocoa in this country.” He emphasized
Ghana’s intent to send more cocoa and other agricultural products to the United States
as Ghana partners with America in trade. He indicated that Ghana would expand its
cocoa production with the hope that the country would gain market shares from
American trade. Nkrumah stated that the total amount of cocoa planted, harvested, and
exported by Ghanaian farmers would be dependent on the United States' level of foreign
exchange in Ghana.20
Henry Kearns, the United States Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
International Affairs, reported that the United States hoped American business with
Ghana would grow. American trade with Ghana showed the readiness of the United
States to support Ghana. American traders developed an interest in trading with Ghana
as American capitalists sought a new region for investment. American capitalists
decided to deposit their surplus capital and products in Ghana. The United States'
foreign policy attempted to help Ghana launch towards modernization. Americans
believed that modernized nations would be less susceptible to communist influence.21
United States Trade Fair in Accra, Ghana
The United States Government Scholarship program sponsored the Trade Fair
organized in Accra, Ghana, from November 24 to December 24, 1961. The fair sought
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to demonstrate potential trade relations between the two countries. The fair also aimed
at strengthening the bond between the two nations for trade in products, techniques, and
equipment exchange. Americans who worked in the fashion industry and unions used
the Trade Fair as an opportunity to market American products.22 On January 30, 1961,
Representative Charles Coles Diggs Jr., an African American and United States
congressman, sent a letter to C. Yaughn Ferguson, Jr., Assistant Secretary on West
African Affairs. Diggs requested further information on the international Fair expected
to take place in Ghana in November 1961. Specifically, Diggs asked for information
about the United States participation in the event, the personnel needed for the
American exhibitions, and the method to use in selecting staff for the American
exhibition. Congress collaborated with Ghana even at the preparatory stage, with the
hope of maximizing profit from the contact with Ghana while supporting the newly
independent nation towards its transformation.23
The site and the date of the occasion became the next subject for discussion.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Embassy concluded that the Trade Fair
would take place in November right after the Queen of England's visit to Ghana. State
officials had concluded that the Queen would visit Ghana in 1961, though the exact
date remained unknown. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would confirm the date for
the Trade Fair provided the chosen site would be available for the event on the
scheduled date. The Ghana Educational Trust owned the amphitheater site, the field
selected for the Trade Fair. The Ministry of Education financed the Ghana Educational
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Trust, a semi-governmental institution. The government indicated its readiness to use
any recommended site for the event because of the importance of the Trade Fair as a
steppingstone towards America's support to Ghana through trade interactions.24
The United States organized the Trade Fair to promote trade and tighten the
trade connections between Ghana and the United States. The program organizers added
exhibitions that benefited Ghana's commercial, economic, and industrial development.
Moreover, the exhibitions created an avenue to advertise the significance of small
industries and businesses in the American economy. Trade Fair exhibitions showcased
the pivotal roles of the United States' small industries. The fair’s slogan was, "Small
industries are big business." The idea of promoting small businesses in Ghana and
emphasizing their roles in boosting the economy became the driving force behind the
fair. Small businesses in America had contributed massively towards the national
economy. Smaller firms in America amounted to less than 50 percent of all United
States' industries. However, the smaller firms produced one-third of all manufactured
goods in America. Smaller firms also accounted for one-half of all wholesale products
in America. The Trade Fair highlighted the roles of smaller firms in boosting the
American economy. The fair inspired Ghanaians to believe smaller firms had a role to
play in modernizing Ghana through trade.
The American Embassy in Accra partnered with the Ghanaian press and printed
the Trade Fair program for circulation. The printed program detailed how the United
States controlled its economy, income distribution, and growth of businesses. The
printed paper also explained the division of share ownership in American institutions
by low and middle-income people. These ideas would help Ghanaians and the
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government in the transformation of the new country's economy through trade.
Ghanaians gained insight into how America had sustained its economy over the years.
Ghanaians then translated the ideas into practice, boosted their trading system, and
moved closer until the economy deteriorated in the late 1960s.25
Thomas P. Rock, a 38-years old African American, born in Brooklyn, became
the designer for the American trade exhibition. His close relations with Ghana
contributed towards the success of the fair. Rock's connection to his African ancestry
might have contributed to his commitment and dedication to an African country. He
had studied industrial design at Pratt Institute in New York. Rock, a man of attractive
personality, received the offer to design the Trade Fair with pride and puzzlement. The
Office of International Trade Fairs' spokesperson believed Rock got the offer because
of his ability not because he was a person of color. In March 1961, Charles Clarke, the
deputy chief of design and construction of the Office of International Trade Fairs, called
Rock and discussed the design contract with him. Clarke offered Rock the opportunity
to design the Trade Fair in Accra, Ghana. Rock showed interest in the offer. Hitherto,
the Creative Playthings Incorporation in New Jersey had employed Rock as a designer
and production supervisor. Mr. Rock received an offer letter from Clarke two days after
they discussed the contract. Clarke detailed the needs and purposes of the Trade Fair in
the contract letter. After a few weeks, Rock traveled to Washington and discussed the
Trade Fair with State Department officials. Already, Rock had gained experience by
designing American sponsored Trade Fairs in Poland, Greece, Russia, and Sweden.26
The American government's invitation of Rock to plan the Ghana Trade Fair
created the path for the formation of the new industrial enterprise of Tysinger/Rock
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Associates Incorporation. Burton Tysinger, an architect, and industrial planner from
North Carolina became Rock's cooperator. When Rock landed in Ghana, he observed a
modern warehouse building. Rock described Ghana as not only undeveloped but
backward as well. Yet he commended Ghanaians for their intelligence and asserted that
Ghana's economic development had been rapid towards progress. He believed
Ghanaians' intelligence would accelerate Ghana's modernization through trade. Rock
assisted the new country in transforming its economy into a modernized one. His
nationality did not influence his attraction to Ghana nor his desire towards the
industrialization of the country. The Ghanaian habit of hospitality and energy attracted
Rock. His desire to contribute towards modernizing Ghana through trade relations
increased in a short time. Rock recommended the types of exhibits he thought would
be useful in Ghana, mainly exhibits on light planes, computers, and motorboats.
Rock contributed immensely towards the Trade Fair after thoroughly studying
the Ghanaian social-economic system. The Trade Fair strengthened trade between
Ghana and America and taught Ghanaians new techniques and technology to build their
economy through trade. Moreover, the fair that Rock designed highlighted the role of
small businesses in a country's economy. Francis H. Russell, the American Ambassador
in Accra, during his speech at the Trade Fair opening, reported that the food and fiber
showcased at the fair were products from the private and cooperative businesses in the
United States while the various machines were from the small firms in America.27 The
fair promoted the operation of private firms and smaller businesses in Ghana.28
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Ghanaians showed great interest in the fair because they believed America supported
the launch of Ghana as a developed nation through trade assistance.29
The Ghana Educational Trust chairman optimistically forecasted that the
United States Trade Fair would be the most significant fair ever to be organized in
Ghana. America's desire to support Ghana signaled through the attention given to the
preparation of the Trade Fair. Concurrently, the Republic of China envisaged
organizing a rival trade show in Ghana in either the month of August or September
1961. China hoped to demonstrate industrial development under a communist regime.
An official of the Ghanaian Trade Ministry wanted the United States' Trade Fair to
surpass that of Chinese. Therefore, he gave an American embassy officer a draft of the
Chicom fair proposal to alert the United States about the strength of the Chinese
intended show. The Ghanaian trade official's action indicates Ghana's preference for
American-style modernization. Ghanaians showed this preference despite the intense
growth of nationalistic activities and the growth of the Soviets' influence.30
Americans perceived the Trade Fair as the most significant attempt to
showcase America to Ghanaians. The Trade Fair also became the medium to counter
the Soviet's economic and cultural influence in Ghana. The show needed to be
successful in improving the United States' position in Ghana. The Trade Fair became
the stage for America to prove itself to Ghanaians since both the Soviets and America
rallied behind building the Ghanaian trade system. Ghanaian officials and the United
States Embassy wanted the Trade Fair exhibit to include cocoa processing exhibits.
Americans consumed enormous amounts of cocoa products, and Ghana was the largest
producer of cocoa beans. America's purchase of Ghanaian cocoa contributed
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significantly towards building the Ghanaian trade system, of which cocoa had been the
primary product. Moreover, the Embassy believed there must be an exhibition to
showcase the growth of the United States in the housing field.31
Richard Erstein, director of the United States Information Service, counseled
that Americans should promote the Trade Fair in a proper perspective. The Trade Fair
should help Ghanaians to understand the trading system and capitalize on it to build
their trade system. He also advised that Americans should not use a film of President
Kennedy's inauguration because it presents people of color as inferior. The film showed
segregated audiences and relegated people of color as inferior beings to white. Erstein
recommended instead, exhibits should showcase racial cooperation in the United States
and high living standards for people of color in America. Americans believed any traits
of racism would tarnish their image in Ghana. America desired to use every possible
means to showcase itself as a country to win the heart of Ghanaians while supporting
them in building up its trade system.32
It had been the utmost desire of the American government to ensure stronger
trade relations between Ghana and the United States. Russell announced that the fair
would serve as a tool to strengthen the bond between the United States and Ghana.
Firms in the United States represented at the Trade Fair included the International
Division of United States Industries, Rocks International Corporation, Great Northern
Overseas Cooperative, Reese Associates Incorporation, and Miller Sewer Rod
Company. American firms that attended the fair produced the latest sewage, sinks,
handy lavatory tools, lawn mowers, cars, electronic manufactured products, plants, and
machinery. Enterprises that attended the fair also produced Frick sawmills and
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equipment, summer bandsaws, and equipment, Dorsey's low-beds trailers, cattle vans,
refrigeration vans, Unistrut metal frames, and partitions. These companies traded in
Ghana with the hope of maximizing profits while building the Ghanaian trading system
to boost the economy.33
President Nkrumah Officially Opens the United States Trade Fair in Ghana
On November 27, 1961, President Nkrumah formerly launched the United
States Trade Fair in the presence of about 1,000 seniors of diplomatic corps, industry,
agriculture, trade, and the Ghanaian government. Tawia Adamafio, Minister of
information and broadcasting, Kwaku Boateng, Minister of Interior, L. R. Abavana,
and F.K.D Goka, Minister of Trade and Finance, all attended the launching of the Fair.
About 18,609 people attended on November 28, while about 20,320 attended on
November 29. Many Ghanaians had to climb the fence to have a taste of the exhibitions.
The total attendance of 38,929 reported for the first two days outnumbered the entire
population of Accra, Ghana's capital, where the event took place. The total number of
people who attended the Fair for the first two days indicates Ghanaians’ eagerness to
learn new techniques and transform their economy. Nkrumah generally avoided
attending such events in the preceding years. He turned down many invitations to
participate in the opening ceremonies of Trade Fairs that the Soviets funded in Accra
before the United States Trade Fair. However, Nkrumah conspicuously attended the
United States Trade Fair. The priority he gave to the United States in his bid to
modernize Ghana influenced his decision to attend the launch of the American Fair.
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Nkrumah had been optimistic about the United States' support in building the country's
trade system; hence he prioritized the American Trade Fair.34
During his speech, President Nkrumah announced that Ghana was “Against any
form of discrimination in economic matters” due to Ghana’s policy of non-alignment
and positive neutrality.35 Nkrumah told attendees at the Trade Fair that “We make no
apology for the steps we have taken recently to strengthen our trade and economic
relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China.” He reported to Ghanaians
and the outside world that Ghana sought to use diverse means to achieve rapid
industrialization and mechanization of Ghana’s agriculture and to transform the
Ghanaian economy.36
Nkrumah actively engaged in the opening ceremonies for the fair. He spent two
hours with his senior ministers touring 33 exhibit centers during the United States Trade
Fair. During his tour, he exclaimed, "This is the first time that I have spent such a long
time at a Trade Fair." The presence of Nkrumah made the United States Trade Fair
distinctive.37 Nkrumah expressed his excitement as he observed the exhibitions in
Ghana. He informed the American ambassador, a Kaiser representative, Department of
Commerce Officials, and other individuals that he would come back for another visit.
As he toured the exhibit centers, he inquired about the background of the Ghanaian
demonstrators with the hope of knowing how long they had undergone training for the
exhibition. Nkrumah became overwhelmed with two demonstrators who had not
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received any prior training except the four days of teaching. The fact that Ghanaians
developed the capability to operate the exhibits after only a few days of training showed
their potential to build the Ghanaian economy through trading activities. Ghanaians
needed American support to build the trading system. Nkrumah perceived Ghanaians
demonstration of the exhibitions as a mark of Ghana's road to modernizing its trade
industry through the support of the United States. He became optimistic that Ghanaians
who receive few days of training from Americans would contribute towards
modernization. Ghanaians' enthusiasm and ability to demonstrate what Americans had
taught them meant that with limited guidance, Ghanaians would be on track to
modernize their nation. At a point during his tour, Nkrumah told Tawia Adamafio,
minister of Information and Broadcasting, that the government could establish a
training institution in Ghana using the techniques and tools demonstrators utilized. For
Nkrumah, the exhibition showed real potential for trade and commerce between Ghana
and the United States, which would contribute to transforming Ghana.38
Various firms manufactured houseware items during the exhibition. The Trade
Fair included cocoa industries exhibits. The cocoa exhibits taught Ghanaians how
Americans used cocoa, their number one export product in producing chocolate and
cocoa butter. Ghanaians developed insights into processing the cocoa beans in Ghana
into a finish product, and that boosted the Ghanaian economy. Unfortunately, Ghana’s
dependence on cocoa led to a decline of the Ghanaian economy when cocoa prices fell.
The fall in cocoa prices affected cocoa products thereby leading to the fall of Ghana’s
economy in the 1960s.39
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At the fair, Ghanaians encountered new products, purchased various items,
established networking with private enterprises, and learned from the exhibitions. The
presence of the various private firms at the Trade Fair showed the role of private
organizations in Ghana-America relations. The American private firms contributed to
shaping the Ghanaian trading system as they produced goods and sent them to Ghana
for sale. Moreover, the United States private companies trained Ghanaians for the
exhibition exercise with the hope that Ghanaians would use the techniques to build their
industries. Besides, the presence of the various private firms made Nkrumah reconsider
his view of private companies. He now believed private firms had a pivotal role to play
in his vision of modernizing Ghana. Therefore, he began to prioritize such private firms
in national affairs.40
The Trade Fair marked a moment of showcasing the attraction of new and
significant American investments in Ghana. Over 31 countries attended the exhibition,
and their presence advertised available opportunities in Ghana to the outside world. The
exhibition showed the interest the American government and business people had in
trading with the new African country. The Trade Fair increased the imagination of
Ghanaians and stirred up the economic relationship between America and Ghana. The
exhibition established a practical, do-it-yourself spirit, which demonstrated the
American style of helping new countries that seek to achieve economic progress. The
Trade Fair education exhibition became the most practical to the Ghanaian industrial
context. The training taught Ghanaians many industrial skills meant to equip them in
building their new nation. About 130 students, mostly young individuals, attended the
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fair to learn from many courses, including electronic courses.41 For years after
independence, America contributed towards Ghana's modernization agenda.42
Trade Relations and Investment in Ghana at the end of Nkrumah's Reign
Nkrumah's government begun to fall apart five years preceding his overthrow.
His grand economic plans for Ghana and Africa, in general, landed Ghana in debt.
Nkrumah failed to use the funds generated from Ghana's trade revenue to focus on the
new country's modernization. Ghana became overburdened with debt due to Nkrumah's
numerous activities in different parts of Africa. He expanded his vision to assist other
African countries, including Congo. He wanted to use Ghana's income to support his
Pan-African vision of creating the United States of Africa and modernizing the entire
African continent. These high hopes fatally burdened his vision of transforming Ghana
through trade. Nkrumah's high trade expectations never materialize in Ghana. The
refusal of the C.P.P. government to increase the minimum wage of workers lowered the
standard of living and sparked mass demonstrations in Kumasi, Accra, and SekondiTakoradi. Between 1960-1965, average wage levels fell by twenty percent in the private
sector while the public sector decreased by forty percent.43
Ghana paid a heavy price as she strived to achieve economic independence. The
economical price the new country paid for modernization contributed significantly to
the collapse of Nkrumah's government in early 1966. The country struggled with a high
external economic debt in state-owned industries and the debt accumulated through
cargo ships that Western nations and Communist blocs financed. The debt outstripped
the Ghanaian economy, and Nkrumah's government negotiated with foreign creditors
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to reschedule payments by December 1965. Nkrumah initially envisaged a reduction of
foreign influence in the manufacturing and shipping of products. However, his
government ended up opening the entire economy to more considerable international
control. Foreign creditors began demanding economic policies that would favor the
rescheduling of their credit payments. Ghana could no longer have absolute control
over trading activities in Ghana.44
The total debt the Nkrumah government left became challenging since Ghana
depended strongly on the agriculture economy. While cocoa exports to the United
States and other places could have improved the economic situation, cocoa began to
lose its share value on the market, though Ghana continued to be the largest producer
of cocoa. Some Ghanaians attributed the decline in cocoa value to lousy weather
conditions. Cocoa farmers' morale fell because of the economic situation in Ghana.
Besides, farmers lacked the money to afford replanting, new technology, or
insecticides. Ghana's economic dependence on cocoa and the fall in cocoa price
severely burdened the Ghanaian economy. After Nkrumah was overthrown, the United
States still maintained trade relations with Ghana with the hope of contributing to
Ghana’s economy, but the Ghanaian trade system declined.45
Conclusion
This chapter examined the United States' trade relations with Ghana and how
the trade relations contributed towards modernizing Ghana. America-Ghana relations
granted the United States access to Ghana's cocoa, gold, diamond, timber, cotton, coal,
petroleum products, fats and oils, and others. Ghana also imported American finished
goods. Nkrumah remained reluctant to ally more with the United States in Ghana's trade
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relations due to the continuing concerns that the American C.I.A. had created in some
developing countries. Nevertheless, he allowed the United States to trade with Ghana,
and America organized the largest Trade Fair ever in Ghana. The Trade Fair granted
Americans an opportunity to sell their products. At the same time, Ghanaians had the
privilege to learn new skills through various exhibitions. American groups and
individual traders visited Ghana frequently during the nation's first decade.
Unfortunately, the poor economic conditions in Ghana that emerged at the end of
Nkrumah's reign began to deteriorate America-Ghana trade relations. After Nkrumah
was overthrown, America's interest in promoting trading activities in Ghana drastically
declined, and no measure could quickly recuperate American investment. Today,
America and Ghana have good trade relations, with each supporting the other to
develop its economy.
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Conclusion
Ghana became the first country to gain independence in Sub-Saharan Africa.
As a nation that sought to achieve modernization, Ghana swung back and forth in its
relations with the West and East. The newly independent government envisaged
positive neutrality and non-alignment, but it still related to both the East and West.
Ghanaians believed independence meant to be free from all forms of foreign
dominations. However, Ghanaians thought modernization depended on support from
foreign powers. Hence, Ghana's alliance with the United States ensured the
development of industrialization, educational expansion, and trade expansion. As a
baby in the woods, Ghana depended on the United States' support in launching itself
towards the vision of modernization.
Ghana

experienced

significant

challenges

and

development

in

its

transformation from a colonial state, to an independent state, and to a Republic. The
newly independent nation transformed from total dependence on Great Britain into an
interactive relationship with the United States. Kwame Nkrumah, the first prime
minister and president of Ghana, played an instrumental role in the United States'
relations with Ghana. He initially showed skepticism toward the United States relations.
Nevertheless, Nkrumah came to believe his vision of modernizing Ghana could only
materialize through American support. Ghana's position as the first country to gain
independence in Sub-Saharan Africa, coupled with Nkrumah's charismatic personality,
spurred the desire of both Europeans and Americans to establish a relationship with
Ghana. His experience as a student in both London and the United States prepared
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Nkrumah to work with America. Nkrumah's political connections in London made
America believe that Nkrumah understood the Western system and could work
efficiently with the United States.1
Ghana plunged into a series of difficulties as the leader of the independence
movement in Africa. Immediately after independence, tribal rivalries began weakening
the unity of the new nation that had stood and fought consistently against the common
enemy, Britain. The demise of the common enemy now created territorial rivalries
among the various tribes, especially those in northern Ghana. Externally, Ghana faced
the challenge of international relations with the United States. Ghana had proclaimed
non-alignment and positive neutrality from day one of its post-independence eras.
However, the vision of modernization made Ghana swung back and forth with both the
East and West.2
The United States' relationship with Ghana emerged out of Ghana's pursuit of
America's support. United States-Ghanaian relations became heavily influenced by
personal relationships between statesmen as opposed to a relationship wholly centered
on national ideology or economic interest. The bond began from the 1950s with the
United States' desire to pursue its Cold War agenda in Ghana. American-Soviets’
competition elevated the importance of Ghana as the newest prize since both powers
sought to penetrate Africa. Soviets communist’s interest in Africa prompted the United
States' earlier relations with Ghana. President Eisenhower encouraged AmericanGhanaian relations by sending Vice President Nixon to Ghana's Independence Day
ceremony in 1957. Later, Eisenhower invited President Nkrumah to the White House.
However, due to continued tensions and conflicts in the Middle East and Southeast
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Asia, Eisenhower's administration gave little attention to Africa. 3 Nkrumah's policy of
non-alignment displayed Ghana's strength. The new nation demonstrated the ability to
manage its affairs as it simultaneously worked to avoid participation in international
conflict.4
Nkrumah focused on building the Ghanaian economy, which depended on its
relations with the United States. Nkrumah's ability to ensure a stable government
prompted the United States to provide Ghana with the needed support. America
supported the Volta River scheme, provided volunteers for the Peace Corps program,
and developed trade relations with Ghana. Ghana required America's support to
construct the hydroelectric project. Kennedy's assumption to power galvanized Ghana
towards modernization. Kennedy was interested in Africa; hence, he established a
strong personal relationship with Nkrumah over time. The Volta River Project became
a means which Nkrumah sought to industrialize the new nation towards the path to its
economic growth. Most Americans had no problem with his non-alignment policy once
Nkrumah maintained a stable government. American statesmen had declared nonalignment an acceptable ideology for newly independent states. Nkrumah completed
the project before his overthrow in 1966. He gained financial support from America
through his relations with Kennedy though the Volta scheme faced numerous
challenges on its road to completion.
Moreover, Nkrumah's vision of building the Ghanaian education system to
launch Ghana towards modernization materialized with the assistance of the Peace
Corps program during Kennedy’s administration. Besides, through the effort of Cornell
University in New York, the Ghanaian education system and family life transformed.
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By 1966, enrollment and educational facilities had increased compared to 1951. United
States' Peace Corps volunteers and Cornell University faculty posted to Ghana deserve
credit. Volunteers contributed to the expansion of the Ghanaian education system
through their service as teachers and in other extra-curricular activities.
Ghana and the United States also continued to have trade relations over the
years. The two countries exchange goods and services as each sought to improve
economic ties. America depended on Ghana for resources such as cocoa and gold
whereas Ghana also depended on America for finished products. The United States
organized the biggest Trade Fair in Ghanaians’ history, where exhibitions successfully
showcased the potential for trade between the two nations. Ghanaians received a few
days of training for operating the demonstrations, even so, they easily operated
equipment. Private firms contributed to the exhibitions meant to transform the
Ghanaian trade system during the Trade Fair. Americans taught Ghanaians how to
process cocoa, Ghana's main exported product into the finished product. The
exhibitions demonstrated new skills for Ghanaians. Moreover, the fair pinpointed the
role of smaller businesses in the American economy and encouraged positive Ghanaian
sentiments towards small enterprises. It is noteworthy that Ghana-America relations
went beyond state-to-state ties to individuals and organizations interacting with Ghana.
The personal relationship between the various statesmen played a pivotal role in
enhancing a smooth relationship amidst multiple challenges.5
Over the years, tensions in both Ghana and the United States challenged the
United States' relations with Ghana. In Ghana, an anti-American campaign emerged in
the 1960s as riots broke out in Accra, spurred by Ghanaians who thought Americans
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had monopolized their nation's social, economic, and political systems. Also, the
Ghanaian press attacked America and its statesmen for their policies in Africa during
the Cold War. Nkrumah, who had sought United States support, presented a deeper
hurdle as he swung back and forth in his non-alignment policy. Nkrumah and his close
associates became embittered following Lumumba's death in early 1961 and blamed
the West for its role in the Congo crisis and the assassination of Lumumba.
Nkrumah's alignment with the East envenomed the United States Congress.
Besides, the Ghanaian press attacks on America had drawn the attention of the U.S.
Congress, which moved to withdraw America's support from Ghana. The United States
continued to respond by threatening to withdraw its support from the Volta River
scheme. Congress’ aware of Nkrumah's desire to complete the project, hoped that
threatening to withdraw America's funds would make Nkrumah and Ghanaians rescind
their position towards the East.6 President Eisenhower's administration introduced the
Cold War to Ghana, while Kennedy increased its significance. Under President
Johnson, the Cold War overshadowed all diplomatic policies.7
Nkrumah became one of the most successful leaders in Africa, although his
concept of the African Union never materialized. He received aid from both the West
and East for Ghana. Nkrumah's connection with Kennedy granted Ghana favorable
support from America. Kennedy became determined to help the "Third World" break
the shackles of poverty and wanted to use Ghana as a model for the other African
countries. Kennedy hoped Nkrumah would use Ghana's resources to create an
industrialized nation. Nkrumah contributed massively to the building of a new Ghana
even though an appraisal of his activities in Ghana and Africa could contain some
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criticisms. Nkrumah wanted to create a political system centered on African socialism
that could obtain support from both the West and East without shifting totally to one
side. He wanted a system that would benefit Ghanaians by transforming the new nation
into a modernized country. Nkrumah sought the assistance of Kennedy and
Khrushchev, leaders of capitalism and communism, respectively, to help Africans. He
came close to achieving this dream. Nkrumah's most significant weakness had been that
most of his visions had little reality. Nkrumah had bigger ambitions, especially about
the amalgamation of the African states into one state8
Ghanaians sought to use the vacuum the Cold War created to develop the new
country. However, America and the East had sought to use the Cold War to expand
their influence. Both state-to-state and private organizations interacted with individuals
and companies moving to Ghana to support the modernizing of the newly independent
nation. Today, Ghanaians celebrate Nkrumah for his achievements and relations with
the outside world. Ghanaians recognized September 21, the birthday of Nkrumah as a
national holiday and commemorate each year with numerous activities. The whole of
Africa celebrates Nkrumah's vision and achievements. Africans remember his effort
towards the creation of a United Africa, though that vision could not work.
The Ghanaian American relation, as the study has set out to show, had its ups
and downs. This study focused on the Cold War era, a moment when Ghana had
prioritized its independence and declared positive neutrality and non-alignment. The
Soviets' relations with Ghana needs attention due to their interactions with Ghana
during the Cold War. The Ghanaian-American connection today is still a topic
deserving of more research. Issues such as military relations, other economic policies,
and political relations need maximum details. Another detailed study could uncover the
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United States relations with other regions in Africa. Besides, the United States relations
with Ghana in the post-Nkrumah era should also be studied.
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